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As we enter the 2020s, the United States Dollar (“USD”) is
entrenched as the most important currency—the preeminent global
currency. The vast majority of global trade is conducted in USD;
sovereign central banks retain USD as their majority reserve holding
and crude oil is traded (mostly) in USD. Viewed as stable, freely
convertible to other assets, a “safe storehouse” of value and offering
an array of investment options, the United States is also viewed as
governed by the rule of law with an independent judiciary. The
unique status of the USD in the global financial architecture is both
reflective and empowering of US global hegemony. Indeed, USD
sanctions are so powerful they serve as an effective display of US
power extraterritorially without resort to military intervention.
Potentially disrupting the USD-led international financial order, an
ambitious China wants the Yuan to be the next global currency. In
recent years China has masterfully engaged in robust diplomaticeconomic cooperation with developing sovereigns, and burgeoning
alliances incentivize economic alignment with China. This is similar
to the coalition of interests the United States enjoyed in the decades
following Bretton-Woods. Significantly, China—and even US allies—
are incentivized based upon economic self-interest in evading the
extraordinary sanctions power of the USD. A blockchain powered
digital Yuan—the currency of the world’s second biggest economy
(already digitalized to a far greater extent than the United States)
might serve as an intriguing pathway towards a Chinese alternative
to the USD. A digital Yuan may also expedite internationalization of
the Yuan within the massive BRI initiative. To be sure, large and open
US capital markets, political stability, and rule of law stand in stark
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contrast to China’s extensive capital controls, a less transparent
disclosure architecture, and judicial deference to the ultimate
authority—China’s single-party system, the CCP. However, crosscurrents of incentives to evade US financial hegemony coupled with
a pragmatic reformation of China’s capital markets and courts,
should not be discounted. An internationalized digital Yuan would
dramatically affect global finance and political-economic
governance with transformative implications. Although many
Western policy-makers and scholars believe a Yuan-centric model
will be a very long march for China—perhaps taking decades—the
process may be substantially expedited by China’s drive, innovative
technology, and backlash against USD sanctions overuse. Moreover,
crucial reforms needed to internationalize the Yuan can be
accomplished in a much shorter time span than decades. The digital
Yuan—if successful—may dramatically reduce the Long March
timeline. If past performance is any guide, China has demonstrated
an ability to close gaps expeditiously while simultaneously wielding
strategic patience for fulfillment of its strategic objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If the digital currency is closely associated with the US
dollar . . . there would be in essence one boss, that is the US
dollar and the United States. If so, it would bring a series of
economic, financial and even international political
consequences.1

As we enter the 2020s, the USD reigns supreme as the
principal currency used in trade and held by global central banks,
thus firmly entrenching the USD as the indispensable currency
cementing the international financial architecture.2 The
advantages to USD holders are superlative: a safe storehouse of
value of a politically stable sovereign with fully open capital and
real estate markets; an independent judicial system following the

1. Frank Tang, Facebook’s Libra Forcing China to Step Up Plans for its Own
Cryptocurrency, Says Central Bank Official, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 8, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3017716/facebooks-libraforcing-china-step-plans-its-own
[https://perma.cc/6U27-VN3Z]
(PBOC
official
commenting on Facebook’s Libra).
2. The centrality of the USD in international affairs and economics spurred envy and
resentment and conferring an exorbitant privilege on the United States. See Ben Bernanke,
The Dollar’s International Role: An “Exorbitant Privilege”?, BROOKINGS INST.: BEN BERNANKE
BLOG (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/01/07/thedollars-international-role-an-exorbitant-privilege-2/ [https://perma.cc/28QQ-ARAT].
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rule of law;3 a freely convertible currency; and a usable payment
option both in the United States and globally.
The unique status of the USD in the global financial
architecture enables the United States to project power
extraterritorially without resorting to military confrontation4 thus
conferring unparalleled advantages to the United States.5 Imposing
USD financial sanctions on foreign entities is an awesomely
effective stratagem to promote US policy objectives,6 and the USD
has been aggressively deployed in recent years forcing both friend
and foe to adhere to US directives in a variety of geo-strategic and
economic contexts: Swiss bank secrecy;7 Chinese shipping

3. Demonstrating this judicial independence is the Ralls litigation wherein a Federal
Circuit Court found in favor of a Chinese investor challenging CFIUS. See generally Ralls
Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (D.C. Circuit rejects
Executive Branch attempt to deprive foreign nationals of property rights, asserting that
due process requires notice of unclassified evidence in which an official actor relies, even
against the compelling interest of National Security.); see also Jeanne Whalen, Federal court
issues preliminary injunction halting administration’s ban of Chinese app WeChat, WASH.
POST
(Sept.
21,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/09/20/wechat-ban-blockedtrump/ [https://perma.cc/YV3P-86CT] (“A federal court has granted a preliminary
injunction halting the Trump administration’s planned ban of Chinese app WeChat . . . ”).
4. See Natasha Turak, U.S. Isn’t Weaponizing the Dollar; Sanctions are the Alternative
to
War,
Mnuchin
Says,
CNBC
(Dec.
15,
2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/mnuchin-us-isnt-weaponizing-dollar-sanctionsare-alternative-to-war.html [https://perma.cc/UGS9-MTS9] (reporting that the US
Treasury Secretary admits US sanctions are a replacement for war).
5. See Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Superpowers:
How U.S. Regulators Should Respond, 40 Gᴇᴏ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ. L. 1239, 1266 (2009) (asserting that
USD reserve status provides substantial monetary and fiscal latitude to US policy-makers).
6. Khalid Al Ansary, Iraq Could Risk Dollar Access, Oil Marketing if U.S. Troops Out,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-11/iraqcould-risk-dollar-access-oil-marketing-if-u-s-troops-out [https://perma.cc/5WTA-QX99]
(“Iraq’s government could lose access to its dollar account at the Federal Reserve if the
Trump administration imposes sanctions. . . . Iraq could be hampered from getting the cash
it needs for its commercial purposes if sanctions were imposed by the U.S. and access to
its central bank account restricted, and the country’s creditors could also call in Iraqi
debts.”).
7. See Robert Wood, 10 Facts About FATCA, America’s Manifest Destiny Law Changing
Banking
Worldwide,
FORBES
(Aug.
19,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/08/19/ten-facts-about-fatcaamericas-manifest-destiny-law-changing-banking-worldwide/#531f10d51305
[https://perma.cc/48FE-DBL6] (“Non-compliant institutions could be frozen out of U.S.
markets, so everyone is complying.”); see also Nick Mathiason, Switzerland Faces Sanctions
Over
Banking
Secrecy,
Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ
(June
22,
2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jun/22/europe-demands-swiss-banks-
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entities,8 banks,9 and technology companies;10 Russian oligarchs;11
the EU-Russian gas pipeline Nord 2;12 and the targeting of
adversarial states.13 In a USD-centric global financial architecture,
being sanctioned and unable to access USD markets risks
catastrophic economic consequences and can hobble any nation to
such an extent that even the threat of USD sanctions is
devastating.14
tax-transparency [https://perma.cc/R6Z5-24EZ] (discussing the threat of sanctions
forcing bilateral agreements to crackdown on tax havens).
8. See Brian Scheid & Arthur Richier, US Sanctions Six Chinese Companies, Executives
for
Oil
Trade
with
Iran,
S&P GLOBAL PLATTS
(Sept.
25,
2019),
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/092519-ussanctions-six-chinese-companies-executives-for-oil-trade-with-iran
[https://perma.cc/VP33-TBR6].
9. See Beau Barnes et al., Argument, The United States Is Going After China’s Banks,
FOREIGN POLICY (July 21, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/21/the-unitedstates-is-going-after-chinas-banks/ [https://perma.cc/5SD5-GPXQ].
10. See Alexandra Alper, Exclusive: White House Considered Kicking Huawei Out of U.S.
Banking
System
Sources,
REUTERS: TECH. NEWS
(Dec.
3,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-usa-treasury-exclusive/exclusivewhite-house-considered-kicking-huawei-out-of-us-banking-system-sourcesidUSKBN1Y717U [https://perma.cc/FW68-UBHX].
11. See Brenna Hughes Neghaiwi & John O’Donnell, Credit Suisse Freezes $5 Billion of
Russian
Money
Due
to
U.S.
Sanctions,
REUTERS
(Aug.
22,
2018),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-credit-suisse-gp-sanctions/credit-suisse-freezes-5billion-of-russian-money-due-to-u-s-sanctions-idUKKCN1L71LR [https://perma.cc/ZJ9VEQDY]; see also Kati Pohjanpalo, A Russian Billionaire Is Threatening Nordic Banks’ Dollar Access,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-12/arussian-billionaire-is-threatening-nordic-banks-dollar-access [https://perma.cc/7WKTSFRX] (“Russian billionaire Boris Rotenberg is suing four Nordic banks for not doing
business with him. The oligarch . . . is on the U.S. sanctions list. . . . The banks in question . .
. risk losing access to the dollar market if they breach U.S. sanctions.”).
12. See Holly Ellyatt, US Greenlights Sanctions on Mega Russia-EU Gas Pipeline, But It’s
Probably Too Late, CNBC (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/18/ussanctions-on-nord-stream-2-pipeline.html [https://perma.cc/X68T-C7RM].
13. See Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Iran, Exec. Order No. 13,876, 84 Fed. Reg.
30573 (June 24, 2019) https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/06/26/201913793/imposing-sanctions-with-respect-toiranhttps://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/06/26/2019-13793/imposingsanctions-with-respect-to-iran [https://perma.cc/6H9C-TJKR] (sanctions against Iran).
14. See Pohjanpalo, supra note 11 (“There’s already a recent precedent of a European
bank collapsing after it came under threat of being excluded from the U.S. financial system:
Latvia’s ABLV Bank AS was liquidated in February 2018 after the U.S. Treasury Department
proposed banning it, saying the bank helped process illicit transactions.”) (emphasis
added); see also Nicholas Comfort & Aaron Eglitis, Europe to Wind Down Latvian Bank
Targeted
by
U.S.
Over
Sanctions,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
23,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-24/europe-to-wind-downlatvian-bank-targeted-by-u-s-over-sanctions [https://perma.cc/Z8V2-6K9P] (discussing
the liquidation of Latvia’s ABLV Bank).
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USD sanctions are not only effective, there is little apparent
risk. In contrast to military confrontation, other sovereigns cannot
meaningfully respond let alone retaliate. Therefore, preserving
USD exceptionality is a vital US national security, simultaneously
both reflecting and empowering US geo-strategic hegemony.
Indeed, in response to growing interest in the virtual
money/asset Bitcoin,15 President Trump stated that Bitcoin was no
competitor to the USD, tweeting that the USD will forever reign as
the world’s most important currency:
It is by far the most dominant currency anywhere in the World,
and it will always stay that way. It is called the United States
Dollar!16

President Trump’s confidence is understandable. Prior
challengers touted as potential USD rivals have failed in attempts
to unseat the USD.17 As a further exemplar, Chinese efforts at
encouraging Yuan internationalization remain dwarfed by the
power of the USD:18
The dollar is the gold standard. If the euro couldn’t overtake it,
the Chinese renminbi (RMB) sure won’t. Add to the fact that
many of the core economies are angry with China for a lack of
transparency regarding the new SARS coronavirus and it is

15. See Maeve Allsup & Lydia Beyoud, Bitcoin Deemed ‘Money’ Under D.C. Financial
Services Law, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 24, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/bitcoin-deemed-money-under-d-c-financial-services-law [https://perma.cc/A8HBQ3SE](holding that Bitcoin is money).
16. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Tᴡɪᴛᴛᴇʀ (July 11, 2019, 8:15 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1149472285905940480
[https://perma.cc/4PVA-6779](last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
17. To be sure, other prior USD rivals such as the Japanese Yen in the 1980s and the
Euro in the 2000s, failed to topple the USD. See Gabriele Galati & Philip Wooldridge, The
Euro as a Reserve Currency: A Challenge to the Pre-Eminence of the US Dollar? 1, 7 (Bank for
Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 218, 2006), https://www.bis.org/publ/work218.htm
[https://perma.cc/3KA8-2WKA] (“At its peak in the late 1980s, the yen had accounted for
over 10% of reserves.”); see also id. at 16. (“[T]he available data suggest that the euro’s
share of reserves rose during the first few years after monetary union but then levelled off
after 2003. In early 2006, the euro’s share was still well below the US dollar’s share and
below even the share of euro legacy currencies in the 1980s and early 1990s. The euro
comes closest to challenging the dollar in its role as a store of value. As a unit of account
and medium of exchange, the dollar’s role is not as secure as it once was, but the dollar is
still pre-eminent.”). Moreover, despite China’s decade long efforts, Yuan usage is still
dwarfed by the dominance of the USD. However, as discussed below, emergent technology
together with a critical mass of interests might expedite more extensive Yuan usage.
18. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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even less likely that its key trading partners settle trade in the
local yuan post-pandemic.19

As a result, commentators and policy-makers believe that the
USD will remain the uber-currency for decades.20
Yet, history proves that no global reserve currency lasts
forever.21 US Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell readily
conceded the fact that global reserve currencies such as the USD do
not reign forever.22 While the USD has numerous incumbent
advantages over the Yuan, and reserve currencies do not easily fall,
incipient transformative developments may erode the exceptional
role of the USD. This article opines that the supreme confidence in
the USD’s hegemonic encasement is misplaced for three principal
reasons; motivation, innovation and blowback. As explained
immediately below, these factors strongly suggest that claims that
the “Yuan threat” to the USD will “take many decades” to unfold
may reflect hubris as opposed to an objective evaluation.

19. See Kenneth Rapoza, China is Nowhere Near Replacing the Dollar, Fᴏʀʙᴇs (Apr. 23,
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/04/23/china-is-nowhere-nearreplacing-the-dollar/#161d65484dfd [https://perma.cc/5ZGU-7MCJ]; see also Gita
Gopinath, Opinion, Digital Currencies Will Not Displace the Dominant Dollar, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
7,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/e5dd66b8-2ca0-11ea-84be-a548267b914b
[https://perma.cc/R4LU-RB7V] (stating that replacing the USD will take a very long time
if even possible).
20. Former IMF Chief Economist Kenneth Rogoff believes the Yuan will not replace
the Dollar for a very long time. See Kenneth Rogoff, Commentary, The High Stakes of the
Coming Digital Currency War, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/global-battle-for-digital-currency-supremacy-by-kennethrogoff-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/UFE9-ZL46] (opining that Yuan is “many decades away
from supplanting the dollar in the legal global economy.”); see also The Semiannual
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hearing on Monetary Policy and the State of the
Economy Before the U.S. S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (July
11, 2019) (statement of Jerome Powell, Chairman, Fed. Res.) [hereinafter Semiannual
Report] (stating reserve currency needs an open trading nation with open markets and the
rule of law).
21. See Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, Death of a Reserve Currency 1, 5 (Fed. Rsrv.
Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2014-17, 2014), [https://perma.cc/3ALY-SCEH]. The
demise of the Bank of Amsterdam ushered in a long period of currency dominance for the
British pound. The passing of the torch from the florin to the pound in the 1780’s has a
number of parallels with the better-known transition from the pound to the dollar in the
1920’s and 1930’s.”).
22. See Semiannual Report, supra note 20 (admitting the USD will not last forever as
the global reserve currency.).
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A. Motivation: A Digital Yuan is an Existential National Security
Priority for China
The United States and China are locked in a strategic rivalry
for global dominance with enormous implications on the
international governance architecture in law, trade and finance.23
Within the context of the United States-China economic24 and
financial market rivalry,25 the weaponization of finance should be
viewed as an emerging national security issue for both
superpowers.26 Illustrative is China’s recent national security law
which has triggered substantial US criticism but extensive bipartisan political support for US sanctions:
Chinese banks seen as complicit in Beijing’s clampdown on
Hong Kong face being cut off from much of the global financial

23. See Joel Slawotsky, The Clash of Architects: Impending Developments and
Transformations in International Law, CHINESE J. OF GLOB. GOVERNANCE 3, 83, 88, 98, 100-01,
104-08 (2017) (discussing the effects of China’s ascendancy and how this will affect
international law and global governance as well as potentially impacting domestic
governance of sovereigns militating towards a Chinese governance model).
24. See Andrew Rennemo, With China Sanctions, America Pushes the Limits of Its
Financial Power, DIPLOMAT (June 19, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/withchina-sanctions-america-pushes-the-limits-of-its-financial-power/
[https://perma.cc/EQ7B-FLA2] (“U.S. Commerce Department tightened sanctions on
iconic Chinese technology firm Huawei. The company and 114 of its international affiliates
already faced a U.S. export ban, implemented in May 2019 and followed by months of
aggressive diplomacy intended to isolate the firm from Western markets. The new
restrictions prohibit companies operating outside the United States from using U.S.-made
designs or inputs to produce the semiconductors that Huawei needs for its smart phones
and tablets.”).
25. See David Lawder & Gabriel Crossley, Mnuchin Says IMF and World Bank Funds
Won’t
Repay
Debts
to
China,
YAHOO
FIN.
(Mar.
12,
2020),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/mnuchin-says-imf-world-bank-092550135.html
[https://perma.cc/8NMY-ZPKT] (“The U.S. Treasury is working with the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank to gain full transparency of countries’ debts from
China’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative and ensure that funds from the institutions
are not used to repay China. . . . Mnuchin told a hearing, ‘We’re not ever going to be using
money from these international organizations to pay back China.’”); see also Alan
Rappeport, U.S. Objects to World Bank’s Lending Plans for China, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/05/business/us-china-world-bank.html
[https://perma.cc/Y35H-EEJE] (reporting that President Trump urging the World Bank to
stop lending money to China).
26. See Joel Slawotsky, National Security Exception in an Era of Hegemonic Rivalry:
Emerging Impacts on Trade and Investment, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND POLICY 3-5 (J. Chaisse et al. eds., 2019).
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system under wide-ranging sanctions that are a part of newly
enacted U.S. legislation.27

Leveraging USD centrality to limit China’s access to financial
markets28 and US banking29 would cause serious damage to China
and, if relations deteriorate substantially, may become an
important US geo-economic stratagem.
For China, facing a bonafide risk of reduced or eliminated
access to USD and/or US capital markets, banking and/or the
SWIFT payments messaging system could be disastrous. Given the
risks to China and Chinese companies, and with the proverbial
sword of Damocles hanging over their heads,30 China is extremely
motivated to avoid such a scenario.31 China is therefore
existentially incentivized to replace the USD-centric international
economic architecture.32
Experts and policy elites argue that the USD will remain the
hegemonic currency for “many decades” because, in contrast to the
United States, China imposes relatively strict capital controls and
limits on foreign investment.33 However, China is already planning
27. Takeshi Kawanami, US Threatens to Cut Off Chinese Banks’ Access to Dollars,
NIKKEI ASIA (July 16, 2020), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Finance/US-threatens-tocut-off-Chinese-banks-access-to-dollars [https://perma.cc/WF9Y-S5W8].
28. See Alper, supra note 10.
29. Id.
30. See Josh Chin & Eva Dou, American Lawmakers Push to Sanction Chinese Officials
Over
Xinjiang
Camps,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
29,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-push-to-sanction-chinese-officials-overxinjiang-camps-1535554800?ns=prod/ accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/H6WN-CP8M].
31. Cissy Zhou, US dollar payment system debate continues, can America cut China off
from SWIFT?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 22, 2020, 06:30 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3094100/us-dollar-paymentsystem-debate-continues-can-america-cut [https://perma.cc/V8ST-VHP9] (“Debates
continue among Chinese officials and analysts as to whether the United States has the
ability and willingness to reduce or even completely cut off China’s access to the US
dollar system, reflecting a sense of uneasiness in Beijing about the potential ramifications
of a financial war with Washington.”).
32. Orange Wang, China’s cut of US dollar weighting in key index will boost global
fortunes of yuan, economists say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 2, 2020, 08:00 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3044353/chinas-cut-usdollar-weighting-key-index-will-boost-global [https://perma.cc/4328-G3G8] (“China’s
decision to cut the weighting of the US dollar in a basket of foreign currencies used to
determine the strength of the yuan will help Beijing’s long-term efforts to weaken the
international dominance of the American currency.”) (emphasis added).
33. See Noah Smith, World is Stuck with the Dollar as Reserve Currency, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-11/world-isstuck-with-the-dollar-as-the-reserve-currency [https://perma.cc/Y4P2-8KR4] (“USD will
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on reforming its capital markets, allowing foreign investors to
acquire shares and debt as well as modifying capital controls.34
Such reform efforts—absolutely critical to China’s ambitions—
may not take decades to achieve when directed and encouraged by
the single-party led Chinese government unencumbered by
divisive debate and political gridlock.
B. Innovation: Emerging Technology and Expediting Yuan
Internationalization
Emerging technology may expedite the internationalization of
the Yuan. In 2014, the People’s Bank of China (“PBOC”) commenced
exploratory research into blockchain and financial technological
innovation.35 In late 2019, and possibly in response to US tech titan
Facebook’s endeavors with respect to the Libra Project,36 Chinese
President Xi Jinping stated that China must seize the high ground
and become the innovation leader with respect to blockchain
technology.37 China is therefore directing its state-capitalism
governance model’s policies to expedite the development of a
digital Yuan. Specific details of China’s plan for a digital Yuan are
unknown but reports indicate China’s Central Bank Digital
Currencies (“CBDC”) will be a blockchain based official currency
backed and firmly controlled by the PBOC.38
remain the reserve currency for a very long time”); see also The High Stakes of the Coming
Digital Currency War, supra note 20 (“America’s deep and liquid markets, its strong
institutions, and the rule of law will trump Chinese efforts to achieve currency dominance
for a long time to come. . . . [The Yuan is] many decades away from supplanting the dollar.).
34. China Accelerates Capital Market Reform to Counter Virus, U.S., Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ Nᴇᴡs
(Jun. 24, 2020), https://www.bloombergquint.com/markets/china-accelerates-capitalmarket-reform-to-counter-virus-u-s [https://perma.cc/Q8UE-P8F4] (reporting that
China is undertaking substantial reforms to encourage investment).
35. The date of the project is noteworthy as it pre-dates the current confrontational
tone in relations between the United States and China. See Jonathan Cheng, China Rolls Out
Test of Digital Currency, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinarolls-out-pilot-test-of-digital-currency-11587385339
[https://perma.cc/F72R-NXKG]
(project started by PBOC in 2014).
36. Significantly, Libra is primarily grounded on the USD. See infra note 239 and
accompanying text.
37. See Liu Zhen, Chinese President Xi Jinping calls for more research, investment into
blockchain technology, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 19, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3034716/chinese-president-xijinping-calls-more-research-investment [https://perma.cc/W93M-L887].
38. See Andy Mukherjee, Say Goodbye to Banking as We Know It, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-29/china-has-edge-
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CBDCs—or
blockchain
based
official
government
currencies—will be transformative and play an integral part of the
developing digital international monetary system and world
economy, revolutionizing financial services, banking and the global
financial infrastructure.39 CBDCs are in various stages of
development, but China’s progress is the most significant. In
comparison with the United States, China’s CBDC is substantially
more advanced than a potential digital USD.40 The US Federal
Reserve is proceeding slower than China’s PBOC and of course the
US governance model is not only procedurally different but must
also consider complex substantive issues such as individual
privacy and data control issues.41
By first introducing a CBDC—the digital Yuan—China may
earn “first mover advantage” and influence global standards with
respect to CBDC definitions and regulations.42 A digital Yuan on a
centralized platform will enable faster transactions per second—
far in excess of the present capability of the existing USD financial
institutional architecture.43 China’s domestic governance permits
over-silicon-valley-to-end-banking-as-we-know-it
[https://perma.cc/WA8Z-KCRV]
(“Little is known about the digital yuan except that it’s been in the works for five years and
Beijing is nearly ready to roll. The consensus is that the token will be a private blockchain,
a peer-to-peer network for sharing information and validating transactions, with the
People’s Bank of China in control of who gets to participate. To begin with, the
currency will be supplied via the banking system and replace some part of physical cash.
That won’t be hard, given the ubiquitous presence of Chinese QR code-based digital
wallets such as Alipay and WeChat Pay.”).
39. See Jesú s Ferná ndez-Villaverde et al., Central Bank Digital Currency: Central
Banking for All? 2 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. WP 20-19, 2020),
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/workingpapers/2020/wp20-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA8Z-KCRV] (“We could be . . . at a
juncture where changes in technology—namely, the introduction of digital currencies—
may justify a fundamental shift in the architecture of a financial system, a central bank
“open to all.’”).
40. Sarah Allen et al., Design Choices for Central Bank Digital Currency: Policy and
Technical Considerations 82 (Brookings: Glob. Econ. & Dev., Working Paper No. 140, 2020)
(“China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (“PBOC”) has pursued creation of a CBDC
more actively than any other global economic power. They are the first major economy to
pilot a sovereign digital currency.”).
41. See infra Part IV.C.1.
42. See Chen Jia, China Promotes Global Digital Fiat Currency Standardization, CHINA
DAILY
(Dec.
8,
2018),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/08/WS5c0b159da310eff30328fd61.html
[https://perma.cc/H5UM-USKF].
43. Allen et al., supra note 40, at 6 (stating that CBDCs offer the benefit of “increasing
the speed of transactions.”).
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the fusion of government-business interests44 allowing for the
rapid development and issuance of a CBDC unencumbered by
privacy concerns or partisan political objections. By early 2020, the
initial testing of the digital Yuan has already commenced,45
including testing in cities46 and with commercial enterprises.47
For China, leadership in a blockchain based CBDC would be a
natural consequence of its already globally leading digital
economy48 and would further enhance China’s digital lead.
Moreover, the potential to merge AI, digital payments and
blockchain, and generate an unprecedented amount of data
(crucial for AI leadership) can be utilized to promote China’s
economic and strategic interests. A screenshot of the initial digital
Yuan e-wallet is available and demonstrates the basics: the ability
to store digital cash, request funds, send-and-receive funds, review
all transactions, and link accounts (presumably bank and financial)
to the e-wallet. Surely the functions will increase and diversify.49

44. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the
Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 670 (2015) (discussing the “complex relationships between
Chinese firms and the Chinese state.”).
45. See Paul Muir, US chains to join digital yuan test scheme, ASIA TIMES (Apr. 25,
2020),
https://asiatimes.com/2020/04/us-chains-to-join-digital-yuan-test-scheme/
[https://perma.cc/4K5V-R356] (“The announcement of that pilot program, which
appeared to focus on retail and catering, follows another recent test in Suzhou where the
digital yuan was being used to give subsidies to local workers for transport.”).
46. See Cheng, supra note 35 (“China’s central bank has introduced a homegrown
digital currency across four cities as part of a pilot program, marking a milestone on the
path toward the first electronic payment system by a major central bank.”).
47. See Frank Tang, China includes McDonald’s, Starbucks, Subway on list of foreign
firms to test digital currency, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3081291/mcdonaldsstarbucks-subway-among-foreign-firms-set-test [https://perma.cc/8URW-J5CV]
(“American chains Starbucks, McDonald’s and Subway were named on the People’s Bank
of China (PBOC)’s list of firms that will test the digital currency in small transactions with
19 local businesses.”).
48. See Alyssa Abkowitz, The Cashless Society Has Arrived— Only It’s in China, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-mobile-payment-boomchanges-how-people-shop-borrow-even-panhandle-1515000570
[https://perma.cc/N2XH-VYK6] (stating that China is the world leader in digital
transactions with almost $10 trillion in 2019).
49. China’s central bank digital wallet is revealed, LEDGER INSIGHTS,
https://www.ledgerinsights.com/china-digital-currency-wallet-dcep-cbdc/
[https://perma.cc/TEQ7-DB54] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
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C. Blowback: Backlash against Over-Deployment of USD Sanctions
US strategic adversaries such as China are incentivized to seek
a USD alternative, however, there is also increasing interest among
US allies.50 The United States has enormous extraterritorial
leverage over any entity that needs to access USD as long as USD
clearing is within the legal architecture of US institutions. In recent
years and within various contexts, US allies and the neutral Swiss
have “folded” in response to US demands: for example Swiss banks
violating domestic secrecy laws, banks paying enormous fines for
aiding and abetting violations of sanctions and stopping work on
the Nord 2 gas pipeline.51 Whether perceived as interference in
internal affairs or eliminating profit, US allies are displeased with
the sanctions that have been leveled as well as the prospect of
being subject to future US sanctions.52
While no US ally would dare to openly defy the United States,
should an alternative currency become viable, there may be
support among US allies to use it as a payments mechanism and a
reserve bank asset.53 Indeed, despite strong US pressure not to join
China’s AIIB or BRI, numerous US allies have embraced China’s
development initiatives.54 US allies are calibrating their relations
not wanting to jeopardize relations with either the United States or
China.55 Therefore, the possibility of shared mutual self-interest
which could erode USD hegemony, should not be ignored.
This article discusses China’s digital Yuan and the potential
effects on the USD’s status as the preeminent global currency.
50. Resentment is not new, but resentment has not previously had a potential outlet.
See infra note 75 (referring to USD as “exorbitant privilege” of the United States).
51. See infra Part III.C.2.
52. See infra Part III.C.2.
53. See Bojan Pancevski & Laurence Norman, Germany Calls for European Firewall
Against
U.S.
Sanctions,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
27,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-calls-for-european-firewall-against-u-ssanctions-11577459502 [https://perma.cc/949M-ZZMX].
54. See The National Security Exception in US-China FDI and Trade: Lessons from
Delaware Corporate Law, supra note 26 (“Former US Treasury Secretary Summers
referring to the fact that dozens of U.S. allies joined the AIIB despite immense U.S.
pressure not to do so as ‘the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of
the global economic system.’”).
55. See Katrina Manson & Jamie Smyth, Australia treads careful line on China in US
meeting, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/43c65abc-748e-485484e8-6aee70d793c2 [https://perma.cc/YX24-SMR8] (confirming that Australia has no
intention of damaging ties with China).
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While scholarly attention has been focused on the ongoing trade
war, scant focus has centered on CBDCs in the context of the USChina rivalry and the potential disruptive effect on the global
governance architecture. Yet this development arising out of
emergent technology has the potential to transform the Yuan into
a widely utilized currency challenging USD dominance.
Ramifications of a successful Yuan-centric financial architecture
dwarfs the impact of the trade war.56 Perhaps the reason for a lack
of attention is the conventional wisdom of US policy elites and a
majority of academics that dethroning the USD is—even if
contemplatable—not realistic until very far off in the future.57
China has already established international governance
mechanisms which can promote Yuan internationalization and
usage such as the AIIB (which can serve as a conduit for lending
digital Yuan) and the BRI (which can incentivize BRI members to
use the digital Yuan).58 China can therefore offer a viable
alternative currency much more expeditiously as technological
innovation expedites processes that might historically have
occurred over a longer time frame. Furthermore, a digital Yuan is
not only a national security priority for China but appeals to
sanctioned parties (and entities concerned about being subject to
USD sanctions) since a digital Yuan could serve as a conduit for
conducting business outside the purview of USD sanctions. Thus,

56. For example, blockchain powered national currencies have enormous
transformative potential as transactions could be tracked, monitored and conceivably
controlled. See generally Joshua Baron, Angela O’Mahony, David Manheim, & Cynthia
Dion-Schwarz, National Security Implications of Virtual Currencies, RAND CORP. (2015),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1231/R
AND_RR1231.pdf [https://perma.cc/X92X-8N4C] (discussing national security
implications of digital national currencies).
57. See The High Stakes of the Coming Digital Currency War, supra note 20
(“America’s deep and liquid markets, its strong institutions, and the rule of law will
trump Chinese efforts to achieve currency dominance for a long time to come. China’s
burdensome capital controls, its limits on foreign holdings of bonds and equities, and the
general opaqueness of its financial system leave the renminbi many decades away from
supplanting the dollar in the legal global economy.”); see also Gopinath, supra note 19.
58. See Joel Slawotsky, On China’s Long March, LARRY CATÁ BACKER Bʟᴏɢ (June 2,
2019), https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2019/06/joel-slawotsky-on-chinas-longmarch.html [https://perma.cc/P8D4-7E39] (“Since the triage of hegemonic power is –
economic – technological – military, each of the stratagems employed by China must be
viewed in the context of the ultimate goal. Just viewing Chinese initiatives - AIIB or BRI or
Yuan oil trading - in isolation and not as components of China’s brilliant strategy is a
fundamental error.”).
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usage of a digital Yuan may be an attractive option even with US
allies who are already discussing issuing CBDC without US
participation.59
The article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the historical
perspective of the USD’s development and its current hegemonic
status. Part III discusses the robust imposition of USD sanctions
and the increasing interest in seeking an alternative to being
subject to sanctions. Part IV provides an overview of China’s digital
Yuan and analyzes the political-economic implications of a
successful implementation.
II. US DOLLAR 1940s-2020: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CURRENT
STATUS
Ever since the dollar cemented its role as the world’s
dominant currency in the 1950s, it has been clear that
America’s position as the sole financial superpower gives it
extraordinary influence over other countries’ economic
destinies.60

This Part discusses the unique role61 the USD currently plays
in the international economic order, describing how the USD
developed into an integral fulcrum of global trade, finance and
reserve assets, and also highlights the recent increases in Yuan
usage.
A. Bretton-Woods
In the aftermath of World War II and the devastation in
Europe, the United States spearheaded efforts to rebuild a global
59. Press Release, Bank of England, Central Bank Group to Assess Potential Cases
for Central Bank Digital Currencies (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/news/2020/january/central-bank-group-to-assess-potential-casesfor-central-bank-digital-currencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A64-9U42] (“The Bank of
Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Sveriges
Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank, together with the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), have created a group to share experience as they assess the potential
cases for central bank digital currency (CBDC) in their home jurisdictions.”).
60. America’s aggressive use of sanctions endangers the dollar’s reign, ECONOMIST
(Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/01/18/americasaggressive-use-of-sanctions-endangers-the-dollars-reign [https://perma.cc/5XAS-2BXA].
61. See Jim Glassman, The Global Role of the US Dollar, J.P. MORGAN (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.jpmorgan.com/commercial-banking/insights/global-role-us-dollar (USD is
the key global currency) [https://perma.cc/R379-WT7C].
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trading system.62 The centerpiece of the new international
economic architecture was the Bretton-Woods agreement63 which
incentivized nations to align their economic and political systems
with the US model of open markets and rule of law, thus ensconcing
global finance and the “bones of international business” as a UScentric system.64 The gold-backed USD was viewed as the best
option or “as good as gold” to use as a means of exchange,65 renew
global trade, stabilize the global economy and re-build wealth
which would promote international peace and security.66
Bretton Woods was a pivotal transformation empowering the
United States to essentially underwrite67 the global USD-based
monetary system:68
As the Bretton Woods System evolved in the 1950s, the US
dollar became the primary international reserve asset. The
system became a gold-dollar system, reminiscent of the

62. After World War II, the United States homeland emerged unscathed and America
solidified its position as the most powerful economy in the world. Bretton Woods, a large
conference held in the United States, underscored American dominance of the
international economic architecture. See Steve Schifferes, How Bretton woods reshaped the
world, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7725157.stm
[https://perma.cc/MA9X-P94K] (after WWII Europe was ruined and the U.S. was the sole
nation empowered to re-build the global order).
63. See Sandra Kollen Ghizoni, Creation of the Bretton Woods System, FED. RESERVE
HISTORY
(Nov.
22,
2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/brettonwoodscreated
[https://perma.cc/P3NA-SEDQ].
64. See On China’s Long March, supra note 58 (explaining “[t]he U.S. business model,
[is] built into the bones of the current framework for global trade.”).
65. See Peter Goodman, The Dollar is Still King. How (in the World) Did That Happen?,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/business/dollarcurrency-value.html [https://perma.cc/42KG-3R6K] (explaining that prior to the
turbulence of WW2, gold was used as a means of trade claims along with the use of British
Pounds which had become in the years leading up to world war the primary global
currency. As the UK had become a large economic power in the 1850s, the Pound became
the global reserve currency).
66. See Lawrence Summers, Time US Leadership Woke Up to New Economic Era, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/a0a01306-d887-11e4-ba5300144feab7de [https://perma.cc/6JKD-MY5R].
67. Id.
68. See Tyler Cowen, The Lesson of Bretton Woods, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-23/bretton-woods-75thanniversary-expect-the-unexpected [https://perma.cc/8UC9-FHH2] (detailing that
Bretton Woods was the primary factor in USD ascendancy).
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interwar period, when sterling and other currency holdings
supplemented official gold holdings.69

Pursuant to the Bretton Woods agreement, “each member
country declared its currency’s par value in terms of US dollars and
had to defend this exchange rate.”70 The gold standard was still
valid but it was the USD that was linked to gold, extensively used
and redeemable for gold.
However by the late 1960s, concerns increased regarding the
long-term stability of the post WW2 international system
proximately caused by large military spending arising from the
Vietnam War as well as “Great Society” social spending and the
ensuing large US federal deficits. By 1971, in the context of
systemic high US inflation and deficits, US allies began questioning
the long-term sustainability of the existing Bretton Woods system,
increasingly redeeming USD for gold.71 West Germany and
Switzerland subsequently left the Bretton Woods system and in
August 1971 the United States also left Bretton Woods by closing
the “gold window,” precluding the exchange of USD for gold.72 By
closing the gold window, the USD was unlinked to gold73 therefore
transforming the USD into a truly fiat currency—remaining
powerful but increasingly viewed as potentially unstable in the
longer-term. In the early 1970s the USD suffered substantial
devaluations particularly against the German Mark and Japanese
Yen.74 The United States was forced to impose wage and price

69. Michael D. Bordo & Robert N. McCauley, Triffin: Dilemma or Myth? 1, 3 (Bank for
Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 684, 2017).
70. Id.
71. See DAVID FRUM, HOW WE GOT HERE: THE 70S: THE DECADE THAT BROUGHT YOU
MODERN LIFE (FOR BETTER OR WORSE) 295-98 (2001).
72. See Roger Lowenstein, The Nixon Shock, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2011),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-08-04/the-nixon-shock
[https://perma.cc/AZ6R-UFST]; see also Paul Lewis, Nixon’s Economic Policies Return to
Haunt
the
G.O.P.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
15,
1976),
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/08/15/archives/nixons-economic-policies-return-tohaunt-the-gop-nixons-economic.html [https://perma.cc/9VY3-96XT].
73. See Martin Wolf, Renewing the Rules of Good Behaviour, FIN. TIMES (July 11, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/e82a1f48-a185-11e9-a282-2df48f366f7d
[https://perma.cc/T5ZU-UYWP] (explaining “[t]he regime of fixed, but adjustable,
exchange rates collapsed in 1971, when the Nixon administration broke the dollar’s link
to gold.”).
74. See generally Susan Strange, The Dollar Crisis 1971, 48 INT’L AFFAIRS 191 (1972);
see also Henry C. Wallich, The Monetary Crisis of 1971: Lessons to be Learned, PER JACOBSSON
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controls with the major US stock market indexes losing
approximately fifty percent of value between 1973 and 1974
accompanies by a deep recession.75
In a fascinating development during this difficult time in the
US economy, the importance of the USD was cemented through a
significant international political-economic deal between the
United States and Saudi Arabia.76 The Saudis77 agreed to maintain
the price of Saudi oil exports only in USD and would invest the
proceeds of oil sales in the United States, giving rise to what is
referred to as the “Petro Dollar.”78 Pursuant to this understanding,
Saudi Arabia could depend upon the US military to defend the
Saudi regime and Saudi energy assets. Saudi Arabia would also
purchase vast amounts of advanced US military equipment.79 The

FOUND.
(Sept.
24,
1972),
http://www.perjacobsson.org/lectures/1972.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DXS5-VYXP].
75. See
Wayne
Duggan,
YAHOO
FIN.
(Dec.
6,
2017),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/day-market-history-1974-bear-145444464.html
[https://perma.cc/MZ6G-ZZ35].
76. See Simon Has Meeting with Saudi King on Investing in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1974, at 3.
77. Given the importance of Saudi Arabia as an oil supplier, the neighboring
producers implicitly “signed on” and today US military bases are found throughout the
Persian Gulf. See U.S. forces in Gulf region and Iraq, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-usa-presence-factboxidUSKBN1Z72GF [https://perma.cc/8WMA-DTBA] (listing US military bases); see also
PARKER T. HART, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES: BIRTH OF A SECURITY PARTNERSHIP xii
(1998).
78. See Andrea Wong, The Untold Story Behind Saudi Arabia’s 41-Year U.S. Debt Secret,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2016-0530/the-untold-story-behind-saudi-arabia-s-41-year-u-s-debt-secret
[https://perma.cc/6PSS-QEXH] (explaining “[t]he basic framework was strikingly simple.
The U.S. would buy oil from Saudi Arabia and provide the kingdom military aid and
equipment. In return, the Saudis would plow billions of their petrodollar revenue back into
Treasuries and finance America’s spending.”).
79. See Faisal Islam, Iraq Nets Handsome Profit by Dumping Dollar for Euro, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 15, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/feb/16/iraq.theeuro
[https://perma.cc/H56A-K76Y] (explaining the proximate cause of the United States’ Gulf
War against Iraq in was the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia. Yet a contributing cause may also
have been that in the prelude to that conflict, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had priced Iraqi
oil in Euros); see also Carola Hoyos & Kevin Morrison, Iraq Returns to International Oil
Market,
FIN.
TIMES
(June
5,
2003),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2003/feb/16/iraq.theeuro
[https://perma.cc/NXW5-NCGH] (detailing how not surprisingly, after his overthrow, Iraq
returned to US Dollar pricing).
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US-Saudi partnership has held strong for almost fifty years.80
Indeed, the first nation President Trump visited upon his election
in 2016 was Saudi Arabia.81 Because numerous countries—
including China—rely on oil imports, these sovereigns are forced
to maintain large stockpiles of USD in order to import crude oil.82
In every nation other than China—from London to Dubai—crude
oil is priced in USD.83 The near universal need to pay for oil in USD
creates a consistent demand for USDs and supports the USD’s
value. Other Persian Gulf nations such as Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates similarly maintain their price for crude oil in USD.84
80. Attesting to the importance of the US-Saudi strategic partnership—and of the
crucial importance that oil continues to be priced in US Dollars—is that all US Presidents
regardless of political affiliation have embraced the Kingdom and have limited any
criticism of Saudi policy to a minimum. See, e.g., Mark Matthews, White House issues rare
critique
of
Saudi
policy,
BALT.
SUN
(Sept.
16,
2004),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2004-09-16-0409160226-story.html
[https://perma.cc/8TC6-KTEZ] (“The Bush administration delivered an unusual rebuke
yesterday to Saudi Arabia, a longtime ally whose rulers have close ties to President Bush's
family, for violating religious freedom.”); Nicole Gaouette & Kaitlan Collins, Trump signals
US won’t punish Saudi crown prince over Kashoggi killing, CNN (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/20/politics/trump-saudi-arabia/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7D2P-KHGV] (“President Donald Trump signaled Tuesday that he will
not take strong action against Saudi Arabia or its Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for
the murder and dismemberment of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi.”).
81. Ali Vitali & Saphora Smith, Donald Trump Lands in Saudi Arabia on First Overseas
Visit
of
Presidency,
NBC
NEWS
(MAY
20,
2017,
3:04
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/trump-s-first-foreign-trip/donald-trump-landssaudi-arabia-first-overseas-visit-presidency-n762126 [https://perma.cc/GG7R-A9UT].
82. See Yusho Cho & Takeshi Kumon, China, Russia and EU Edge Away From
Petrodollar, NIKKEI ASIA (Jan. 7, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/China-Russiaand-EU-edge-away-from-petrodollar [https://perma.cc/REP5-S5JX] (explaining that
“[C]hina, caught in a trade war with the U.S., is expanding oil trading denominated in
yuan.”).
83. See Clara Ferreira Marques, Oil War May Revive China’s Yuan Ambitions,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-0316/oil-price-war-may-revive-china-s-global-yuan-ambitions [https://perma.cc/5B4E3XNV] (explaining that in 2018, a contract in Shanghai commenced trading in Chinese
Renminbi. This nascent contract has been successful and may potentially serve to replace
the USD as the currency accepted for crude oil acquisition. “Then there’s the steady rise
of Shanghai’s yuan-denominated oil contract, launched in March 2018. As of late last
year, the contract accounted for more than 14% of oil trade on major exchanges,
according to Bloomberg Intelligence.”).
84. Rabah Arezki et al., Coping with COVID-19 and oil price collapse in the Gulf
Cooperation
Council,
WORLD
BANK
BLOGS
(Apr.
21,
2020),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/coping-covid-19-and-oil-price-collapse-gulfcooperation-council [https://perma.cc/4BDC-ZJFH] (explaining that lower USD oil prices
damage economies of oil exporters); see also Crude Oil (petroleum); Dubai Fateh Monthly
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B. Current USD Status
In the intervening years since 1974, the USD has only
increased its status and remains the exceptional currency
“conferring an exorbitant privilege on its nation.”85 Illustrative is
the fact that only the United States was empowered to eviscerate
hundreds of years of Swiss banking secrecy by threatening
sanctions and the loss of access to US financial markets. The Swiss
would not have acquiesced to another nation’s demands.86
The USD’s preeminence in global trade remains
overwhelming. Notwithstanding inroads from the Yuan,87 data
establishes that the vast majority of global trade is conducted in
USD.88 As the Bank of England Governor noted:
The US accounts for only 10 per cent of global trade and 15 per
cent of global GDP but half of trade invoices and two-thirds of
global securities issuance . . . As a result, ‘while the world
economy is being reordered, the US dollar remains as
important as when Bretton Woods collapsed’ in 1971.89

USD dominance is even more impressive because China is the
world’s largest trading nation and yet the USD is far more
dominant than China’s Yuan. The global payments messaging

Price
US
Dollars
per
Barrel,
INDEX
MUNDI,
https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil-dubai
[https://perma.cc/4ZR4-S74T] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020) (Dubai crude oil priced in USD).
85. See John Plender, America’s Dollar Privilege is Not Exactly Exorbitant, FIN. TIMES
(Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/8d47d6d6-659b-11e9-9adc98bf1d35a056 [https://perma.cc/K8K5-7AJ3].
86. See infra Part III.C.1.
87. See Worldwide Currency Usage and Trades, SWIFT (Dec. 2015),
https://www.swift.com/sites/default/files/documents/swift_bi_currency_evolution_info
paper_57128.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY4N-ZA4V].
88. See Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, Foreign Exchange Transactions And Over-TheCounter Interest Rate Derivatives Hit Record Highs, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2019/09/16/foreignexchange-transactions-and-over-the-counter-interest-rate-derivatives-hit-recordhighs/#648a90fb3c34 [https://perma.cc/JLY3-PEZD] (explaining in contrast, “[t]urnover
in the renminbi, however, grew only slightly faster than the aggregate market, and the
renminbi did not climb further in the global rankings. It remained the eighth most traded
currency, with a share of 4.3%, ranking just after the Swiss franc.”).
89. Chris Giles, Mark Carney Calls For Global Monetary System to Replace the Dollar,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/a775b55a-c5c2-11e9-a8e9296ca66511c9 [https://perma.cc/SKQ7-KCPP].
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platform SWIFT90 reports that the overwhelming currency used in
international transfers remains USD although the Yuan has in
recent years increased.91 US influence over SWIFT and access to
the vast array of USD transactions,92 as well as pressuring the EU
to direct Belgian-based SWIFT to comply with US sanctions
policy,93 is a further manifestation of USD financial hegemony.
Moreover, most central banks of the world maintain their
reserves primarily in USD94—although that onetime near
monopoly is also declining.95 Furthermore, the legacy international
financial institutions (“IFIs”)—namely, the IMF and World Bank—
provide USD financing. Doing so is hardly surprising as the IMF and
World Bank are headquartered in Washington and constitute vital
components of the US-led international financial architecture.
While the principal international financial institutions lend in USD,
90. See
Swift
History,
SWIFT,
https://www.swift.com/about-us/history
[https://perma.cc/J7C4-BNRC] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
91. See Worldwide Currency Usage and Trades, supra note 87, at 6 (explaining “[t]he
Chinese yuan’s usage continues to grow significantly, particularly in flows between Europe
and Asia-Pacific, which have increased considerably over the last two years, and where the
currency is now ranked fifth. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) demonstrates a strong
commitment to promoting the Chinese yuan, and the Chinese government has
implemented a range of supportive policy measures.”).
92. See Glenn R. Simpson, Treasury Tracks Financial Data In Secret Program, WALL ST.
J.
(June
23,
2006),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115101988281688182?mod=hps_us_pageone
[https://perma.cc/6UDN-N4KG] (explaining “[s]ince shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, the U.S. Treasury Department has been secretly tracking suspected
terrorist financing through a far-reaching program that gives it access to records from the
network that handles nearly all international financial transfers. The information comes
from a Belgian firm known by its acronym, Swift, which manages much of the world’s
financial-message traffic. Under the program, U.S. counter-terrorism analysts query Swift’s
vast database of billions of financial transactions.”).
93. See Peter Eavis, Important European Financial Firm Bows to Trump’s Iran
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/business/dealbook/swift-iran-sanctions.html
[https://perma.cc/EB9X-3UC3] (explaining that SWIFT adheres to sanctions policy
barring Iranian financial institutions from SWIFT).
94. See Lee Shin-Hyung, China Pushes Ahead With Making Yuan a Global Currency,
ASIA TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/12/article/yuanglobalization-remains-a-long-way-off/ [https://perma.cc/T9SU-HDWV] (explaining
“[m]ore than 60 central banks or monetary authorities around the world now include
the yuan in their foreign exchange reserves. Even so, the yuan accounts for as little as
1.97% of total global foreign exchange reserves.”).
95. See International Monetary Fund, Currency Composition of Official Foreign
Exchange Reserves (COFER), http://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D5A09EC4E62A4 [https://perma.cc/J88J-DDUJ] (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
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the newer IFIs such as the Chinese-led AIIB have also been lending
in USD:
The China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment bank has ruled
out lending in currencies other than the dollar, its new
president said at the weekend, signalling that Beijing will not
use the development bank as a platform to promote renminbi
internationalisation.96

The USD is so entrenched, even Chinese borrowers issue USD
denominated bonds.97 However, incipient developments and
trends indicate the potential for a transformative shift away from
USD centrality in the global economic order.
C. Incipient Yuan Internationalization
In 2016 the IMF added the Yuan to the Special Drawing Right
(“SDR”) basket,98 demonstrating confidence in China’s currency.
However, is Yuan usage in fact increasing internationally?
Preliminarily, with respect to SWIFT data, the possibility that Yuan
usage is underreported exists. For example, China spearheaded a
SWIFT alternative—Cross-border Interbank Payment Service
(“CIPS”), a payment system which started operating in late 2015.99
96. Gabriel Wildau & Tom Mitchell, China’s New Asia Development Bank Will Lend in
US Dollars, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/762ce968-bcee-11e5a8c6-deeeb63d6d4b [https://perma.cc/WTL8-4VAF] (explaining “[t]he China-led Asia
Infrastructure Investment bank has ruled out lending in currencies other than the dollar,
its new president said at the weekend, signaling that Beijing will not use the development
bank as a platform to promote renminbi internationalisation.”).
97. See Vicky Wei et al., Baidu, Tencent Sales Give Kungfu Bonds a Hi-tech Kick in 2018,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/baidutencent-sales-give-kungfu-bonds-hi-tech-kick-2018/
[https://perma.cc/J8TP-H6AA]
(explaining “Chinese issuers sold $202 billion worth of dollar bonds overseas in last year,
almost double the amount in 2016 and contributing 60% of new volumes issued.”).
98. See International Monetary Fund, IMF Adds Renminbi to Special Drawing Rights
Basket,
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/29/AM16-NA093016IMFAdds-Chinese-Renminbi-to-Special-Drawing-Rights-Basket
[https://perma.cc/7M8F9N2T] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (explaining the proximate cause was the IMFs
acceptance in 2016 of the Renminbi into its SDR basket of currencies. The Renminbi joined
other leading currencies; the U.S dollar, euro, yen and British pound. Being so designated
allows the nations to receive part of an IMF loan in that currency).
99. CIPS
Co.,
Ltd.,
CIPS, http://www.cips.com.cn/cipsen/7050/index.html
[https://perma.cc/QLX3-QQ2T] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020). CIPS members include JP
MorganChase, Citibank, HSBC, BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank. CIPS supports crossborder trade payments as well as settlement for financial transactions. See Introduction,
CIPS,
http://www.cips.com.cn/cipsen/7052/7057/33773/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PLB7-SMM3] (describing the system).
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CIPS offers clearing and settlement services for its participants in
cross-border Yuan payments not included in SWIFT statistics.
Thus, taking CIPS into account, Yuan usage is likely higher than
SWIFT statistics would indicate.100
In addition, the USD’s onetime virtual monopoly of reserve
holdings is declining101 as central banks have increased holdings of
Yuan, Euros and Yen.102 For example, the Nigerian Central Bank has
included Yuan as a reserve asset and Nigerian deals are being
denominated in Yuan.103 In Kenya, economists have promoted the
Chinese currency as well.104 Driving the African push towards Yuan
usage and reserve currency status is the fact that African nations’
largest trading partner and lender is China.105
Yet it is not only African nations that have seen their central
banks hold Yuan as reserves. The ECB,106 as well as the central

100. Kazuhiro Kida, Masayuki Kubota and Yusho Cho, Rise of the yuan: China-based
payment
settlements
jump
80%,
NIKKEI
ASIA
(May
20,
2019),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Rise-of-the-yuan-China-based-paymentsettlements-jump-80 [https://perma.cc/6ZUE-T7RY] (noting rise in CIPS transactions);
Koji Okuda, China's global yuan push makes inroads in Asia and Africa, NIKKEI ASIA, (Aug.
25,
2020), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Finance/China-s-global-yuan-push-makesinroads-in-Asia-and-Africa [https://perma.cc/8FP4-EGYJ] ("Growing tensions between
Beijing and Washington have only accelerated China's push to strengthen its own
international settlement framework.").
101. See Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), supra
note 95.
102. Henny Sender, China Pauses to Push to Internationalise its Currency, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/14279cc6-55e4-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1
[https://perma.cc/E3L8-PFTX] (“[Central bank] holdings of the Chinese currency, though
still very small, are slowly picking up — as are other alternatives to the greenback,
especially gold, that “old economy” store of value. As of the third quarter, only 1.8 per cent
of the world’s reserves were in renminbi, according to IMF data. But that was up from 1.1
per cent when the Chinese currency first was included in the data at the end of 2016.”).
103. NAN, Nigeria, China sign currency swap deal, GUARDIAN (May 3, 2018, 9:53 AM),
https://guardian.ng/business-services/nigeria-china-sign-currency-swap-deal/
[https://perma.cc/4LRJ-DJAM].
104. Kenyan Economist Roots for Adoption of Yuan as Reserve Currency in Africa,
XINHUA
NET
(Nov.
19,
2019),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201911/19/c_138567524.htm [https://perma.cc/ZPQ6-WK9T].
105. African Finance Leaders to Debate China’s Yuan as a Reserve Currency – Xinhua,
REUTERS (May 28, 2018, 8:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-yuanafrica/african-finance-leaders-to-debate-chinas-yuan-as-a-reserve-currency-xinhuaidUSKCN1IU00N [https://perma.cc/Q9ZW-VGUB] (discussing how Renminbi is needed to
pay China).
106. Press Release, European Central Bank, ECB Completes Foreign Reserves
Investment in Chinese Renminbi Equivalent to €500 Million (June 13, 2017),
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banks of Germany,107 the UK and Switzerland have initiated Yuan
holdings and Belgium, Spain and others are considering
purchasing Yuan.108 The trend is clear—the Yuan is becoming a
currency central banks are interested in holding.
Another aspect of a move away from the USD is the
increasingly popular movement towards Yuan denominated debt.
Referred to as “Panda bonds”, Yuan denominated debt is generally
acquired by “institutional investors, including companies, foreign
banks, multilateral institutions and sovereigns, who see them as
reliable investment options that could generate steady returns,
besides helping boost economic development worldwide through
the Belt and Road Initiative, and maintaining global economic
stability.”109 Issuers include Pakistan,110 Philippines,111

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ecb.pr170613.en.html
[https://perma.cc/T778-ST9C].
107. Germany to Include Yuan in FX Reserves – C.Banker, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-reserves-yuan/germany-to-include-yuan-infx-reserves-c-banker-idUSL3N1PA20L [https://perma.cc/D4EE-MBTG].
108. Update 2-Europe’s Central Banks Confirm Yuan Holdings, REUTERS (JAN. 16, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/bundesbank-reserves-yuan-belgium/update-2europes-central-banks-confirm-yuan-holdings-idUSL8N1PB3Y5
[https://perma.cc/2SB4-TXUU].
109. Chen Jia, Everyone’s jumping on the panda ‘bondwagon’, CHINA DAILY (June 17,
2019),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/global/2019-06/17/content_37481362.htm
[https://perma.cc/522F-AVBF].
110. Pakistan set to issue China’s Panda bond next year, DAILY TIMES: BUS. (Nov. 29,
2019),
https://dailytimes.com.pk/509826/pakistan-set-to-issue-chinas-panda-bondnext-year/ [https://perma.cc/G9ZE-JFEX].
111. Shri Navaratnam, Philippines to issue 6 bln yuan Panda bonds- sources, REUTERS:
ASIA (Apr. 11, 2019, 4:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/philippines-chinabond/philippines-to-issue-6-bln-yuan-panda-bonds-sources-idUSH9N1YC01A
[https://perma.cc/G9ZE-JFEX].
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Hungary,112 Poland,113 South Korea,114 and Portugal.115 A French
financial institution will be the first EU bank to issue Yuan debt.116
Furthermore, the new Chinese-led IFIs are slowly
transitioning lending away from an exclusive USD-lending basis.
For example, while the AIIBs policy has been to lend exclusively in
USD, the AIIB will be switching to local currencies thereby
initiating a reduction in USD usage:
Using local currency for cross-border financing is a service
usually provided by multilateral development organizations to
hedge against foreign exchange-rate risks arising from
settlement in US dollars.117

The NDB is also endeavoring to expand non-USD lending.118
Various commercial deals are being made in Yuan even before
the introduction of a digital Yuan:
The world’s top listed miner BHP Group said on Tuesday it had
made its first yuan-denominated sale of iron ore to China
112. Hungary Issues RMB 2 bln Panda Bond, BUDAPEST BUS. J. (Dec. 18, 2018, 10:22),
https://bbj.hu/finance/hungary-issues-rmb-2-bln-panda-bond_159245
[https://perma.cc/LZ5S-HRVS].
113. Poland Launches Panda Bond, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/cfbb141a-f084-3bba-a914-e7d2f4251093
[https://perma.cc/UT85-J5D6].
114. Moonyoung Tae et al., South Korea Sells First Sovereign Panda Bonds as China
Opens
Up,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
14,
2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-14/south-korea-markets-firstsovereign-panda-bonds-at-3-3-5-percent [https://perma.cc/7D7T-A2VQ].
115. B. Lana Guggenheim, Portugal Sells Panda Bonds – In Eurozone First, S. EU
SUMMIT (June 12, 2019), https://www.southeusummit.com/europe/portugal/portugalsells-panda-bonds-in-eurozone-first/ [https://perma.cc/3UAA-QPKA].
116. Tom Hogue, Credit Agricole Plans 2 bln Yuan Panda Bond Issue in November –
Sources, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/creditagricolebonds-china/credit-agricole-plans-2-bln-yuan-panda-bond-issue-in-november-sourcesidUSB9N26W03E [https://perma.cc/TAB6-NTUD].
117. See Chen Jia, AIIB to adopt local currency loans in Asia, CHINA DAILY: FIN. (Jan. 30,
2019,
9:28
AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/30/WS5c50fdb2a3106c65c34e73c5.html
[https://perma.cc/2566-54U9] (“The China-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
plans to launch local currency financing in some Asian countries later this year in a move
to reduce cross-border investment risks caused by exchange-rate fluctuations. The first
group of countries to have this new service could include India, Indonesia and Pakistan.”).
118. See Tom Hancock, ‘Brics bank’ seeks move away from dollar funding, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/76707e22-b433-11e9-8cb2-799a3a8cf37b
[https://perma.cc/99S7-B4S6] (“The New Development Bank, a lender owned by Brazil,
India, Russia, China and South Africa, is aiming to almost double its lending this year and
shift its loan book away from the US dollar to emphasise lending in local currencies.”).
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Baoshan Iron & Steel Co Ltd (Baosteel) and would explore
using blockchain for such transactions in future.119

Incontrovertibly, China has successfully implemented
preliminary steps to promote Yuan internationalization, and Yuan
usage is steadily increasing. The Yuan’s long march to
internationalization may be expedited via the digital Yuan as
discussed in Part IV. Crucially, the digital Yuan’s success will be
impacted by the extent to which other nations are willing to utilize
it as China will need partners willing to use Yuan. Therefore, before
examining the digital Yuan, the next Part discusses the developing
blowback against perceived excessive invocation of USD control in
international economic governance.
III. USD CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
[F]oreign officials have been concerned about the implications
for banks of losing access to the U.S. dollar market . . . . In his
letter, Chancellor Osborne stated that ‘[i]t was the perceived
threat of [Standard Chartered Bank]’s loss of access to this
market, rather than any potential financial penalty.120

The United States exercises control over international finance
as exemplified by numerous non-US financial institutions have
been fined for enabling sanctions evasion.121 Most recently, the
United States has threatened sanctions against the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”) in response to ICC plans to open

119. See Min Zhang & Tom Daly, BHP completes first yuan-based iron ore sale to
China’s
Baosteel,
REUTERS: COMMODITIES
(May
12,
2020,
1:51
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-baowu-bhp-idUSKBN22O0LZ
[https://perma.cc/DU2L-VEUB].
120. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The New Financial Extraterritoriality, 87 GEO. WASH.
L.
REV.
239,
288
(2019),
https://abila01.s3.amazonaws.com/media/uploads/2019/10/07/verdier-the-newfinancial-extraterritoriality.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N8H-PYJ7] (“Beyond the magnitudes
of the fines, foreign officials have been concerned about the implications for banks of losing
access to the U.S. dollar market. . . . In his letter, Chancellor Osborne stated that ‘[i]t was the
perceived threat of [Standard Chartered Bank]’s loss of access to this market, rather than
any potential financial penalty, that triggered such a significant reaction’ in the markets.”)
(emphasis added).
121. Joel Slawotsky, Reining in Recidivist Financial Institutions, 40 DEL. J. OF CORP. L.
282, 316 (2015).
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investigations against the US defense operations in Afghanistan.122
This Part provides exemplars of the financial market power
wielded by the United States. As discussed below, the United States
enforces the US-centric paradigm and promotes US interests by
compelling sovereigns to adhere to US policy.
A. Extraterritorial Reach of the United States in Financial Markets
International finance, law, politics, and governance are
inextricably intertwined.123 For example, in the aftermath of Nazi
Germany’s invasion of Norway in 1940, the US Department of the
Treasury established the Office of Foreign Funds Control (“FFC”),
whose mission was to block securities and foreign exchange
transactions of foreign funds by Germany.124 The FFC’s successor
was named the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). The
mission of the OFAC is to disable the access to banks through
enforcement of sanctions and blocking of assets.125 The OFAC
122. Afghan Conflict: US Sanctions ‘Kangaroo’ ICC over War Crimes Probe, BBC (June
12,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53012783
[https://perma.cc/TZ6Q-UJ9T].
123. The connection between money and domestic U.S. law as well as international
affairs is long-running. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions,
https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_general.aspx#567
[https://perma.cc/2229-ZC23]
(“Dating back prior to the War of 1812, Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin administered
sanctions imposed against Great Britain for the harassment of American sailors. During
the Civil War, Congress approved a law which prohibited transactions with the
Confederacy, called for the forfeiture of goods involved in such transactions, and provided
a licensing regime under rules and regulations administered by Treasury.”).
124. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Basic Information on OFAC and Sanctions,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/1501
[https://perma.cc/9NNU-V2U4] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (“The FFC’s initial purpose
was to prevent Nazi use of the occupied countries’ holdings of foreign exchange and
securities and to prevent forced repatriation of funds belonging to nationals of those
countries. These controls were later extended to protect assets of other invaded countries.
After the United States formally entered World War II, the FFC played a leading role in
economic warfare against the Axis powers by blocking enemy assets and prohibiting
foreign trade and financial transactions.”).
125. See id. (“The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of
the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign
policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes,
terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the national security,
foreign policy or economy of the United States. OFAC acts under Presidential national
emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls
on transactions and freeze assets under US jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based
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maintains a list of Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) and
Blocked Persons. Being placed on the SDN List means being subject
to US sanctions.126
The most significant aspect of being on the SDN List is that
assets or property that in some connection become “located”
within the United States are subject to sanctions—i.e., will be
blocked.127 Since the USD plays such a fundamental role in
international trade and commerce, SDN designation in essence
freezes the party out of USD transactions. Therefore, even totally
overseas entities which may use a correspondent US financial
institution to clear the funds transfer cannot effectuate the
transaction since the US banks are under US jurisdiction and are
forbidden from processing the payments.128 The importance of the
USD and concern of violating US law (and losing access to US
markets) translates into most institutions abiding by the SDN
List.129
on United Nations and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve
close cooperation with allied governments.”).
126. Anyone owning fifty percent or more of property (broadly defined including
virtually any asset) located in the United States will have that asset blocked—not seized—
precluding the use or sale or the property. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Foreign
Assets
Control
–
Sanctions
Programs
and
Information,
https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documents/licensing_guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6BM-QZL3]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2020); see also Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 123. Any US
persons (US citizens or US businesses) is prohibited from providing any service or
transacting business with such entities (on the SDN List or who own fifty percent or more
of a property located in the US). See Id.
127. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions: Specially Designated
Nationals (SDNS) and the SDN List, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialsanctions/faqs/topic/1631 [https://perma.cc/CG63-UFEL] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020 )
(“Collectively, such individuals and companies are called "Specially Designated Nationals"
or "SDNs." Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing
with them.”).
128. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions: Blocking and Rejecting
Transactions,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financialsanctions/faqs/topic/1601 [https://perma.cc/7UVC-L3H3] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020 ) (“A
U.S. financial institution cannot so much as advise a letter of credit if the underlying
transaction is in violation of OFAC regulations. In addition, U.S. persons are prohibited
from facilitating transactions by foreign persons that would be prohibited if performed by
a U.S. person. . . . A U.S. financial institution, its foreign branches, and—in some cases—its
wholly-owned or -controlled foreign subsidiaries, cannot open an account for a person
named on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List).").
129. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Russian
Financial Institution Supporting North Korean Sanctions Evasion (June 19, 2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm712 [https://perma.cc/8GU6-KKV9]
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Crucially, US sanctions are also exercised outside US territory
projecting US policy and power extraterritorially.130 “Sanctions are
among the most important, and most coercive, tools in US foreign
policy short of war.”131 This demonstration of extraterritorial
reach is unmatched and is possible because of the centrality of the
USD in global finance:132
It is worthwhile noting that if the Justice Department can
overcome 400 years of Swiss bank secrecy it is unlikely that
banks located in other tax havens could prevail in a battle
against our tax cops.133

In recent years, USD sanctions have promoted US geostrategic interests and defense against strategic adversaries.134
USD sanctions constitute critical strategic deployments aiding and
(stating sanctions were placed on Russian bank for aiding North Korea to evade sanctions);
Ian Talley, Treasury Blocks Chinese Bank From U.S. Financial System Over North Korea Ties,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-blocks-chinese-bankfrom-u-s-financial-system-over-north-korea-ties-1509667328 [https://perma.cc/7JSHNHEK] (“The Trump administration officially cut off a small Chinese bank from the U.S.
financial system on Thursday, accusing it of helping North Korea develop its illegal ballistic
missile program.”).
130. See The High Stakes of the Coming Digital Currency War, supra note 20 (“US
regulators have vast power not only over domestic entities but also over any financial
firms that need access to dollar markets.”).
131. Rob Berschinski, Trump’s ICC EO Will undercut all U.S. Sanctions Programs, JUST
SECURITY (June 16, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/70796/trumps-icc-eo-willundercut-all-u-s-sanctions-programs-is-that-why-treasury-isnt-conspicuously-on-board/
[https://perma.cc/MK3F-PRG4].
132. For example, the position of US government enforcement agencies with respect
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) is clear—a non-US person’s use of a
correspondent US bank from anywhere in the world to effectuate USD payments
constituting the bribe (in whole or in part) brings that defendant within the jurisdiction of
the FCPA. See The FCPA Resource Guide, CRIMINAL DIV. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ENF’T DIV.
U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N 1, 10 (July 2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/file/1292051/download [https://perma.cc/3R6T-MVLY] (FCPA violations can be
prosecuted when the conduct involves “using the U.S. mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce . . . [including] placing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, text message,
or fax from, to, or through the United States involves interstate commerce—as does sending a
wire transfer from or to a U.S. bank or otherwise using the U.S. banking system . . . ”)(emphasis
added).
133. Robert E. McKenzie, Swiss Bank Secrecy Succumbs to U.S. Tax Enforcers, FORBES
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/irswatch/2014/02/03/swiss-banksecrecy-succumbs-to-u-s-tax-enforcers/#6f424c2611bb
[https://perma.cc/KW7YRUXG].
134. Sanctions Programs and Country Information, supra note 126 (containing
detailed information about sanctions and specific sanctions programs and the linkage
between national security defense and use of sanctions).
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abetting the extraterritorial reach of US law since large swaths of
global transactions and institutions are connected to the US
banking sector.135 Therefore, a bank or financial institution located
outside the United States which either violates United States law
or transacts with a sanctioned party will itself be subject to
sanctions and prosecution.136
The exceptional role of the USD protects US national security
and substantial economic policy latitude to US policymakers both
for both domestic economic purposes137 and global politicaleconomic interests.138 Sanctions are strategically invoked to
promote and advance US national interests such as preventing EU
dependence on Russian natural gas:
[The Nord 2 gas pipeline is the] Kremlin’s key tools to exploit
and expand European dependence on Russian energy
supplies, tools that undermine Ukraine by cutting off gas
transiting that critical democracy, a tool that ultimately
undermines transatlantic security. 139

With respect to EU entities collaborating with the Nord 2
Russia-Germany gas pipeline, US Secretary of State Michael

135. See, e.g., Brett Forrest and Bojan Pancevski, Russia’s Gas Pipeline to Europe Faces
Sanctions
Under
U.S.
Defense Bill,
WALL ST. J. (Dec.
11, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-gas-pipeline-to-europe-faces-sanctions-under-us-defense-bill-11576065601 [https://perma.cc/X8U5-R3DX] (United States pursuing
sanctions to stop Russian gas pipeline).
136. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705; see also 31 C.F.R. § 560.203; see also 31 C.F.R. § 560.204.
137. See generally Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Superstars: How U.S.
Regulators Should Respond, supra note 5. US consumers benefit disproportionately from
the dollar’s strength, since foreigners are essentially subsidizing Americans’ habit of
importing more than they export. Id. Also, global demand for dollar-denominated assets
helps keep interest rates low on things like Treasury bonds despite a US federal budget
deficit of more than $1 trillion USD a year. Id. That dynamic encourages governments,
businesses and households to take on ever-growing amounts of debt, which might be
difficult to pay back if borrowing costs suddenly jumped. Id.
138. See Nord Stream 2: Germany and Russia decry US sanctions, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50879435 [https://perma.cc/LGD44GTG] (“The Trump administration fears the pipeline will tighten Russia’s grip over
Europe’s energy supply and reduce its own share of the lucrative European market for
American liquefied natural gas. President Trump has said the 1,225km (760-mile) pipeline,
owned by Russia’s state-owned gas company, Gazprom, could turn Germany into a
‘hostage of Russia’.”) (emphasis added).
139. Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 15,
2020), https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-9/
[https://perma.cc/739U-PDCV] (emphasis added).
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Pompeo was blunt in his message regarding the imposition of USD
sanctions:
Get out now or risk the consequences.140

US Treasury Secretary Mnuchin concedes that sanctions are
used as a means to enforce the US order thus eliminating the need
for military intervention:
‘The reason why we’re using sanctions is because they are an
important alternative for world military conflicts. And I
believe it’s worked . . . So whether it’s North Korea, whether
it’s Iran or other places in world, we take the responsibility
very seriously.’141

Sanctions offer an attractive alternative to costly military
ventures or the time and compromises associated with diplomatic
negotiations compelling foreign sovereigns to advance US national
security interests, cost-effectively:
The U.S. State Department warned Iraq this week that it risks
losing access to a government bank account at the New York
Federal Reserve Bank if American forces are kicked out.142

The mere hint of sanctions can deter sovereigns from
opposing US policy.143 For example, in response to the Iraqi
parliament’s resolution aimed at asking US troops to leave,
President Trump tweeted:
If they do ask us to leave, if we don’t do it in a very friendly
basis, we will charge them sanctions like they’ve never seen
before ever . . . It’ll make Iranian sanctions look somewhat
tame.144

Yet another avenue for USD power is through compliance by
SWIFT of US policy. Founded in 1973, SWIFT is a global banking
gatekeeper of financial messages, indispensable to most
international transfers of USD.145 The United States has substantial

140. Id.
141. Turak, supra note 4.
142. Ansary, supra note 6.
143. Id. (“If they do ask us to leave, if we don’t do it in a very friendly basis, we will
charge them sanctions like they’ve never seen before ever” . . . “It’ll make Iranian sanctions
look somewhat tame.”)
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. SWIFT History, supra note 90.
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influence over SWIFT146 and complies with US sanctions policy
particularly when implemented by the EU.147 An entity that loses
SWIFT access is no longer able to send or receive cross-border USD
payments, which constitutes a severe impediment to participation
in global commerce.148
The ability of the United States to essentially override
domestic laws of foreign nations because of the USD-led
international financial architecture is exemplified by the folding of
Swiss banks to US demands. As recently as 2005 Swiss bank
secrecy was legendary and considered the ultimate place to store
money with absolute confidentiality.149 However, the United States
was able to force Swiss banks to disclose the identities of
depositors or risk access to the USD.150
A further exemplar of the sweeping power arising from US
financial hegemony is the US FATCA (“FATCA”). Under FATCA,
foreign banks and financial institutions outside the territory of the
United States are compelled into handing over to the US IRS
information regarding accounts held by US citizens overseas.151
The ability of the United States to essentially override domestic
laws of foreign nations is stunning. Fearing loss of access to US
financial markets and USD clearing, every nation has “folded” and
146. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
23,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/23intel.html
[https://perma.cc/2N9F-U5VN]; Philip Blenkinsop et al., Payments System SWIFT to Expel
Iranian Banks Saturday, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2012), http:// www.reuters.com/article/usnuclear-iran-idUSBRE82E15M20120315 [https://perma.cc/2N9F-U5VN].
147. Compliance: SWIFT and Sanctions, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/aboutus/legal/compliance/swift-and-sanctions [https://perma.cc/7YN7-2ZJH] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2020).
148. Entities blocked The Pros and Cons of a SWIFT Response, ECONOMIST (Nov. 22,
2014), https://www.economist.com/international/2014/11/20/the-pros-and-cons-of-aswift-response [https://perma.cc/9MHQ-SSHW]; see also Okuda, supra note 100
("Membership in CIPS would allow banks to continue settling Chinese transactions even
under sanctions.").
149. McKenzie, supra note 133 (noting Swiss banking secrecy was effective for
hundreds of years).
150. See Swiss Court Says was Right to Give U.S. Bank Data, REUTERS (July 15, 2011,
10:03
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ubs-idUKTRE76E3RH20110715
[https://perma.cc/7JSZ-FT7A] (A refusal of Swiss banks to comply with US demands
risked losing access to US financial markets posing a serious danger to the Swiss economy).
151. See Internal Revenue Service, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca
[https://perma.cc/4VVE-7XER] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
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despite conflict with domestic privacy laws or other objections, has
“signed onto” FATCA, prioritizing US law over their domestic
law:152
America’s global tax law. And it’s finally here after a four-year
ramp up. It requires foreign banks to reveal American
accounts holding over $50,000. Bank secrecy? Forget it. Noncompliant institutions could be frozen out of U.S. markets, so
everyone is complying.153

Thus, even hegemonic rival, and frequent critic of US
interference into the internal affairs of other nations, China, signed
onto the US FATCA, ostensibly compelling Chinese banks to reveal
private details of their US customers’ accounts.154
B. Examples of Sanctioned Entities: US Adversaries
1. Russia
Russia has been subject to sanctions over its Ukraine military
adventure since 2014:155
Most U.S. designations of Russian persons subject to sanctions
are in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion and occupation of
Ukraine’s Crimea region and areas of eastern Ukraine, as well
as its maritime aggression near the Sea of Azov. To date, the
United States has imposed Ukraine related sanctions on more
than 665 persons.156

The United States has also leveled sanctions against Russian
entities relating to cyber-hacking in the United States and human
rights abuses.157 In December 2019, the United States imposed
sanctions on a multi-billion dollar undersea gas pipeline
construction “Nord 2” between Russia and Germany which if
152. Id.
153. See Robert Wood, FATCA, IRS Global Tax Law, Is Everywhere—Even Russia &
China,
FORBES
(July
1,
2015,
03:17
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/07/01/fatca-is-finally-here-even-inrussia-china/#752884b30cbd [https://perma.cc/3Y3B-4DY9] (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. 79 Fed. Reg. 16169 (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ukraine_eo3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HB45YUEQ].
156. See U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. (Mar.
23, 2020) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10779.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KSC-P7WS].
157. Id.
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completed will enable a vast increase in Russian gas exports into
the EU.158 In response to US sanctions, Russia, like China, is
interested in transacting global trade outside the USD system.
Russia aims to have a lead in blockchain development so that “[t]he
internet belongs to the Americans—but blockchain will belong to
us.”159 The prospect that Russian blockchain development could
abet US sanctions evasion has been under discussion since at least
2016.160 Russia’s central bank is currently studying the possibility
of issuing a central bank digital Ruble.161
2. Venezuela
The United States seeks regime change in Venezuela162 based
upon corruption and human rights abuses,163 labeling President
Nicolas Maduro a dictator and calling for his resignation.164 The
United States placed sanctions on Venezuela,165 focusing on
banks.166 In response, the Maduro regime tried to create an
158. See Nord Stream 2: Germany and Russia Decry US Sanctions, supra note 138.
159. Nathaniel Popper, Blockchain Will Be Theirs, Russian Spy Boasted at Conference,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
29,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/technology/blockchain-iso-russian-spies.html
[https://perma.cc/93GT-AHTZ].
160. Damien Sharkov, Bitcoin Technology Can Help Russia Dodge Sanctions: MP,
NEWSWEEK (June 2, 2016), https://www.newsweek.com/ bitcoin-technology-can-helprussia-dodge-sanctions-mp-465901.
161. Arnab Shome, Russian Central Bank Testing Stablecoin Under Sandbox, Exploring
CBDC,
FIN.
MAGNATES
(Dec.
26,
2019),
https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/russian-central-bank-testingstablecoin-under-sandbox-exploring-cbdc/ [https://perma.cc/9PRD-6LNY].
162. Julian Borger, Trump has Hitched His Wagon to Regime Change in Venezuela – So
Now
What?,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
25,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/25/trumps-white-house-feels-its-waythrough-regime-change-in-venezuela [https://perma.cc/WG8F-VPAL].
163. Countries
&
Areas:
Venezuela,
U.S.
DEP’T
STATE,
https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/venezuela/ [https://perma.cc/38UV-J3PR] (last
visited Oct. 14, 2020).
164. Pompeo Calles on Venezuela’s Maduro to Step Down, Urges Support from Military,
REUTERS (Jan 23, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuelapolitics-pompeo/pompeo-calls-on-venezuelas-maduro-to-step-down-urges-supportfrom-military-idUSKCN1PH2HI [https://perma.cc/2UBW-2LXJ].
165. Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation: Venezuela-Related Sanctions,
U.S.
DEP’T.
STATE,
https://www.state.gov/venezuela-related-sanctions/
[https://perma.cc/497J-UHLD] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
166. Treasury Targets Venezuela Currency Exchange Network Scheme Generating
Billions of Dollars for Corrupt Regime Insiders, U.S. TREASURY (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm583 [https://perma.cc/CQ8P-U4ZT]
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alternative to the USD to evade the sanctions, establishing the
virtual currency “Petro”167 in late 2017, claiming it would be valued
against a basket of commodities including crude oil, natural gas
and gold.168
The inherent danger such a sovereign-backed currency poses
to the USD is abundantly clear:
Unlike traditional state-issued currencies, Venezuela’s petro
could be obtained and spent on goods around the world as
easily as bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency. Imagine buying
a loaf of bread from a bakery in Lincoln, Nebraska, and being
able to pay for it with Venezuela’s petro as easily as
downloading a mobile app.169

The power of the USD sanctions would be sharply curtailed as
“the Petro would allow Venezuela to circumvent US financial
sanctions.”170 The Petro was quickly targeted by the United States
through an Executive Order banning US persons from buying,
selling, trading or holding this virtual currency.171
Venezuela had banked on the Petro evidenced by discussions
in early 2018 whereby Russia would supply trucks and accept the

(“All individuals involved in the scheme spent their portions of the resulting profits on
properties in the United States as well as through maintaining significant accounts in U.S.
banks, and purchasing boats and planes that were registered in the United States.”).
167. Marco Dell’Erba, Stablecoins in Cryptoeconomics: From Initial Coin Offerings to
Central Bank Digital Currencies, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 40-41 (2019) (“Petro, the
cryptocurrency backed by Venezuelan oil and launched in 2018, can probably be
considered part of this list as a first attempt to create a fully backed and public
cryptocurrency.”).
168. See Alexandra Ulmer & Deisy Buitrago, Enter the ‘Petro’: Venezuela to Launch
Oil-backed Cryptocurrency, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2017), www.reuters.com/article/usvenezuela-economy/enter-the-petro-venezuela-to-launch-oil-backed-cryptocurrencyidUSKBN1DX0SQ [https://perma.cc/KU4A-TB3V].
169. Michael del Castillo, Trump Executive Order Banning A Cryptocurrency Could
Mutate Into Far-Reaching Law, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo/2019/09/14/trump-executive-orderbanning-a-cryptocurrency-could-mutate-into-far-reaching-law/#4b4ba38b55d2
[https://perma.cc/K8FT-L9AR].
170. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Russia-based Bank
Attempting to Circumvent U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/venezuela/ [https://perma.cc/8QCV-YP9B].
171. del Castillo, supra note 169 (“executive order signed by U.S. president Donald
Trump last year that banned U.S. citizens, permanent residents and organizations from
buying, holding, trading or spending petro, the cryptocurrency created by the Venezuelan
government and purportedly backed by the nation’s vast oil reserves.”).
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Petro as payment.172 However, Venezuela has failed to convince
other sovereigns to accept the Petro as payment. For example,
Russia will not accept Petros in exchange for trucks.173 Similarly,
offers to India to sell crude oil at a substantial discount in return
for Petro payment174 was rejected by the Indian government.175
Overtures to Turkey were also conducted with initially a warm
reception176 but the Turkish interest has apparently not generated
any Petro transactions.
3. Iran
For approximately forty years—going back to the 1979 US
hostages and the 1983 massacre of US Marines in a Beirut suicide
bombing by Iranian backed terrorists—the relationship between
the United States and Iran has been strained. The United States has
levied sanctions on Iran and Iran has made numerous attempts at
sanctions evasion.177 Several financial institutions have been fined

172. Adam Reese, Venezuela In Talks To Purchase Russian Auto Parts Using Petro
Cryptocurrency, ETHNEWS (Apr. 4, 2018), https://bitnewsbot.com/venezuela-in-talks-topurchase-russian-auto-parts-using-petro-cryptocurrency/
[https://perma.cc/6PEJ2MYJ].
173. Россия не обсуждала с Венесуэлой использование петро, рассказал
Сторчак (Russia Did Not Discuss the Use of Petro with Venezuela, Storchak Said),” РИА
Новости (Russia) (Dec. 13, 2018), www.ria.ru/20181213/1547930868.html
[https://perma.cc/9A2S-SWDA].
174. Molly Jane Zuckerman, India To Get 30% Discount On Venezuelan Crude Oil If
Paid For In Petro, Says Local Source, COINTELEGRAPH (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/india-to-get-30-discount-on-venezuelan-crude-oil-ifpaid-for-in-petro-says-local-source [https://perma.cc/43BM-T336].
175. Nidhi Verma, India says no plans for oil trade with Venezuela using ‘petro’
cryptocurrency, REUTERS (May 28, 2018), https://in.reuters.com/article/indiavenezuela/india-says-no-plans-for-oil-trade-with-venezuela-using-petrocryptocurrency-idINKCN1IT0ZV [https://perma.cc/H46B-EKTP].
176. See Vivian Sequera, Venezuela Cryptocurrency to draw investment from Turkey,
Qatar-official, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2018, 1:51 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscrypto-currency-venezuela/venezuela-cryptocurrency-to-draw-investment-from-turkeyqatar-official-idUSKCN1G025S [https://perma.cc/A9Q7-MVGK]; see also Turkey Willing to
Use
Venezuela’s
Cryptocurrency
Petro,
MENAFN
(Sept.
23,
2018),
https://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.aspx?storyid=1097472947&title=Turkeywilling-to-use-Venezuelas-cryptocurrency-Petro [https://perma.cc/A9Q7-MVGK]; Yamei,
Turkey open to Venezuelan cryptocurrency as trade tender, XINHUA NEWS (Sept. 22, 2018),
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/22/c_137486471.htm [https://perma.cc/Q7P5D75V].
177. Jonathan Schanzer, The Biggest Sanctions-Evasion Scheme in Recent History: And
the swashbuckling gold trader at its center, ATLANTIC (Jan. 4, 2018),
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for aiding and abetting Iranian evasion.178 China has aided Iranian
sanctions evasion,179 principally by buying crude oil from Iran.180
But sanctions have impacted China,181 and the risk of sanctions on
Chinese businesses is having the desired effect.182 Recently,
reports have surfaced of a deal wherein China will purchase large
volumes of Iranian energy payable in non USD currencies.183 Iran
attempted to evade US sanctions by utilizing virtual assets in 2017.
A blockchain company, Brave New Investments,184 was established
with the goal of enabling EU direct investment into Iran via
Bitcoin.185 The idea was to send Bitcoin to Bitcoin wallets the
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/iran-turkey-goldsanctions-nuclear-zarrabatilla/549665/ [https://perma.cc/5CXG-7CHW].
178. Iran attempts to enlist Swiss banks to evade sanctions. See, e.g., Factual
Statement, Exhibit A to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, at 1–2, United States v. Credit
Suisse AG, (Dec. 16, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/file/978881/download
[https://perma.cc/4K56-8Y8S].
179. See Huawei: Meng Wanzhou faces Iran fraud charges, court hears, BBC NEWS
(Dec.
8,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46490053
[https://perma.cc/FL53-Y2BB] (“Meng Wanzhou, daughter of Huawei’s founder, is
accused of breaking American sanctions on Iran.”).
180. Peter Beaumont, Why is China Hiding its Oil Tankers from US Trackers?, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/29/why-is-chinahiding-its-oil-tankers-from-us-trackers [https://perma.cc/6EPE-TZ5X] (“The Trump
administration has stepped up its efforts to track tankers linked to China’s biggest staterun oil company in response to signs that the vessels are helping to transport Iranian crude
in defiance of US sanctions against Tehran.”).
181. Ian Talley et al., U.S. Sanctions Chinese Firms for Allegedly Shipping Iranian Oil,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sanctions-chinese-firmsfor-allegedly-shipping-iranian-oil-11569424569 [https://perma.cc/7X3V-RWVY] (“The
Trump administration blacklisted several Chinese companies including units of a state
giant for allegedly shipping Iranian oil in violation of U.S. sanctions, attempting to cut off
the last vestiges of Iran’s crude exports.”).
182. Nasser Karimi & Jon Gambrell, Iran says Chinese State Oil Firm Withdraws from
$5B
Deal,
AP
NEWS
(Oct.
6,
2019),
https://apnews.com/b11873fcb1ed49cf9ad2d0bfdc38798c
[https://perma.cc/AC7L3U3W] (“China’s state oil company has pulled out of a $5 billion deal to develop a portion
of Iran’s massive offshore natural gas field, the Islamic Republic’s oil minister said Sunday,
an agreement from which France’s Total SA earlier withdrew over U.S. sanctions.”).
183. Farnaz Fassihi & Steven Lee Myers, Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and
Military
Partnership,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
11,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/11/world/asia/china-iran-trade-military-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/GP6H-RW7L].
184. Brave
New
World
Investments,
BRAVE
NEW
WORLD
INV.,
http://www.bnw.investments/ [https://perma.cc/GP6H-RW7L] (last visited Oct. 6,
2020).
185. Michael del Castillo, Sweden Incorporates Iran Investment Firm Using Only
Bitcoin, COINDESK (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/sweden-incorporates-iraninvestment-firm-using-only-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/R7ZX-35Z5].
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company owned and the company would then send the Bitcoin to
Iranian buyers in return for Iranian fiat currency to use to acquire
shares on the Tehran Stock Exchange.186
C. Examples of Sanctioned Entities: Foreign Banks and US
Allies
1. Non-US Financial Institutions
Not all sanctions adversely affect US strategic adversaries. For
hundreds of years, Swiss banks were bastions of financial
secrecy.187 Swiss banking secrecy was sacrosanct and inviolable—
considered a safe place to store assets anonymously.188 As recently
as 2006, Swiss banks were hailed in John Grisham’s “The Broker”
as being absolutely trustworthy not to divulge information to
anyone—not even the US government—regarding US citizen
depositors.189 Notwithstanding the laws of Switzerland, the United
States overrode Swiss domestic law. The US Justice Department
eviscerated Swiss bank secrecy—a feat no other nation was
capable of doing—by threatening the Swiss banks with

186. Yaya J. Fanusie & Trevor Logan, Crypto Rogues, FOUND. DEF. DEMOCRACIES (July
11,
2019),
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/07/11/crypto-rogues/
[https://perma.cc/FW2G-T97K] (“The company received bitcoins from investors and
planned to convert them into Iranian rial to purchase shares of local companies on the
Tehran Stock Exchange.”).
187. Sébastien Guex, The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law and Its
Repercussions for Swiss Federal Policy, 74 HARV. BUS. HIST. REV. 237, 237 (2000) (noting the
history of Swiss banking secrecy).
188. McKenzie, supra note 133 ("It is worthwhile noting that if the Justice
Department can overcome 400 years of Swiss bank secrecy it is unlikely that banks located
in other tax havens could prevail in a battle against our tax cops.").
189. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE BROKER 366 (2005) (the protagonist Joel Blackman
reassures himself that the Swiss banker would not disclose the account to the United States
even with pressure, he remarks, “the Swiss were immune to pressure from foreign
governments . . . they were the Swiss!”). Yet, only a few years later, the ability of the United
States to enforce its taxation system on foreign financial institutions and pressuring the
Swiss banks to disclose the names of account holders eliminated this anonymity. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Four Banks Reach Resolutions
Under Swiss Bank Program (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-announces-four-banks-reach-resolutions-under-swiss-bank-program-0
[https://perma.cc/E7KE-8JRF] (noting additional banks cooperating with the U.S. Justice
Department).
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sanctions.190 Faced with the prospect of losing access to US
financial markets, even the Swiss banks folded.191
In another exemplar, foreign financial institutions have been
subject to prosecution and enforcement proceedings as financial
enablers of sanctioned states and individuals. Foreign banks
including HSBC, BNP, Standard Chartered, Deutsche and others
have paid fines for violating US sanctions.192 Sudan, Iran, Cuba are
among the states the banks aided to conduct transactions with US
financial architecture.193
190. Emma Thomasson, Swiss Court Says was Right to Give U.S. Bank Data, REUTERS
(July 15, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ubs/swiss-court-says-was-right-togive-u-s-bank-data-idUSTRE76E3R920110715 [https://perma.cc/C4NJ-4AXV] (failure to
cooperate with the US Department of Justice would lead to indictments and “would have
seriously impaired Switzerland’s financial markets and have led to serious repercussions
for the Swiss economy.”).
191. See id. (“Since FINMA had compelling reasons to believe that not relinquishing
the customer data to the U.S. Department of Justice would have seriously impaired
Switzerland’s financial markets and have led to serious repercussions for the Swiss
economy, the action taken by it was shown to be lawful.”).
192. Joel Slawotsky, Partnering with Despots and Failed Regimes: Rogue Banking as a
Primary Violation of International Law, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73 (2014).
193. See Dominic Rushe, HSBC ‘Sorry’ for Aiding Mexican Drugs Lords, Rogue States
and
Terrorists,
GUARDIAN
(July
17,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/17/hsbc-executive-resigns-senate
[https://perma.cc/4M5C-Y3NM] (“A report compiled for the committee detailed how
HSBC’s subsidiaries transported billions of dollars of cash in armoured vehicles, cleared
suspicious travellers’ cheques worth billions, and allowed Mexican drug lords buy to
planes with money laundered through Cayman Islands accounts. Other subsidiaries moved
money from Iran, Syria and other countries on US sanctions lists, and helped a Saudi bank
linked to al-Qaida to shift money to the US.”); Patricia Hurtado, BNP Paribas Pleads Guilty
in
U.S.
to
Violating
Sanctions,
BLOOMBERG
(July
9,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-09/bnpparibas-pleads-guilty-in-u-s-toviolating-sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/AG98-98YH] (“BNP, France’s largest bank,
admitted it violated the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading
with the Enemy Act by processing almost $9 billion in banned transactions from 2004 to
2012 involving Sudan, Iran and Cuba.”). See Patricia Hurtado & Gregg Farrell, BNP Planning
Guilty Plea Monday in Rogue-Nations Probe, Deal for Up to $9 Billion, BLOOMBERG (June 27,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-27/bnp-paribas-said-to-plan-guiltyplea-monday-in-u-s-probe.html [https://perma.cc/RTX3-BSKL] (“BNP Paribas SA is set to
plead guilty to criminal charges Monday in Manhattan federal court . . . ending a wideranging probe that may bring the biggest-ever penalty for violations of U.S. sanctions
against rogue nations.”); Ramy Inocencio & Paayan Mathema, Record Fines: ‘New Normal’
for
Banking
Business?,
CNN
(Dec.
12,
2012,
11:14
AM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/11/business/banking-fines-record
[https://perma.cc/432G-9HPG] (“In a historic fine, HSBC will pay out a record $1.92 billion
to U.S. authorities to settle money laundering accusations—activities which have allegedly
occurred with drug cartels in Mexico and terror-linked groups in Saudi Arabia. U.S.
authorities declared HSBC, the UK’s biggest bank by market capitalization, in breach of a
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2. EU Nord 2
The sanctions on the Nord 2 gas pipeline from Russia to
Germany194 have generated criticism within the EU, particularly
from Germany. The United States opposes the pipeline based upon
the expected massive increased reliance on Russian gas and the
significantly increased Russian political and economic leverage
over the EU.195 Germany and other US allies object to USD
sanctions. US sanctions are also relevant to virtual currency
exchanges and banks which process fiat payments with the
exchanges:196
We’re talking about direct and grave interference in Germany
and Europe’s sovereignty and energy policy . . . . Berlin is
pushing for a European response. The bloc’s foreign policy
chief . . . said the European Commission was “preparing the
ground” for counter-sanctions. Critics are sceptical the EU will

series of U.S. laws, including the Trading with the Enemy Act . . . Standard Chartered, the
UK’s second largest bank by market value, agreed to pay $327 million to settle U.S.
Treasury Department charges of violating sanctions on transactions with Iran, Burma,
Libya and Sudan between 2001 and 2007. In August Standard Chartered paid $340 million
to the state of New York’s Department of Financial Services to settle civil charges alleging
it had concealed $250 billion in illegal transactions with Iran.”).
194. Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability, supra note 139 (“This action
puts investments or other activities that are related to these Russian energy export
pipelines at risk of U.S. sanctions.”).
195. Vanessa Dezem, U.S. Escalates Pressure Over Nord Stream 2, Welt am Sonntag
Says, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0725/u-s-escalates-pressure-over-nord-stream-2-welt-am-sonntag-says
[https://perma.cc/3LL2-C8KV] (“The U.S. is increasing diplomatic pressure on European
contractors to drop out of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project . . . A dozen U.S. officials from
three government departments held one-on-one video conferences in recent days with
European contractors to underline their aim to stop the pipeline from Russia to
Germany.”).
196. Exec. Order No. 13,902, 85 Fed. Reg. 2003, 2005 (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/08062018_iran_eo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B6HC-9AAY] (stating that Foreign financial institutions include “any
foreign entity that is engaged in the business of accepting deposits, making, granting,
transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign
exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers
thereof, as principal or agent. It includes, but is not limited to, depository institutions,
banks, savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies, securities brokers and
dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign
exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations,
investment companies, employee benefit plans, dealers in precious metals, stones, or
jewels, and holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the foregoing.”).
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reach consensus, citing its failure to act against the previous
sanctions.197

US allies allege the US sanctions constitute interference with
EU sovereignty and are therefore an exercise of extraterritorial
power.198 US sanctions are also relevant to virtual currency
exchanges and banks which process fiat payments with the
exchanges.199
3. ICC
The United States is now considering USD sanctions on
employees of the ICC—viewed by some as “an extraordinary
escalation of USD sanctions200—on the grounds that the ICC’s
investigation of US troops runs strongly counter to US national
interests.201 The prospect of US sanctions has raised additional
objections from US allies principally in the EU.202 While the ICC is

197. Erika Solomon et al., Germany warns new US sanctions endanger Nord Stream 2
pipeline, FIN. TIMES (July 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/81a1d823-730f-4412a698-670e4fc4f6f1 [https://perma.cc/YX23-9L7N] (“German officials warned that
proposed new US sanctions against the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline threaten
the project’s survival, calling it serious interference in German and European sovereignty.”)
(emphasis added).
198. Nord Stream 2: Germany unhappy with new US sanctions, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June
14, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-germany-unhappy-with-new-ussanctions/a-53805296 [https://perma.cc/B8UJ-8EQM] (“New sanctions would constitute
a serious interference in European energy security and EU sovereignty,” . . . German
Economy Minister Peter Altmaier slammed Washington for “escalating this sanctions
threat, which is extraterritorial and thus in conflict with international law.”).
199. Exec. Order No. 13,902, supra note 196, at 2005.
200. Berschinski, supra note 131 (“Yet even given its arguable overreliance on
sanctions, the administration’s issuance of the ICC E.O. can rightfully be viewed as an
extraordinary escalation. Simply put, personally targeting the staff of an human rights
accountability body established by a widely ratified international treaty in the same
manner as targeting the leadership of North Korea is the foreign policy equivalent
of jumping the shark. Other than the United States and Turkey, the Rome Statute has been
ratified by every NATO ally.”).
201. Adam M. Smith, Dissecting the Executive Order on Int’l Criminal Court Sanctions:
Scope,
Effectiveness,
and
Tradeoffs,
JUST
SECURITY
(June
15,
2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/70779/dissecting-the-executive-order-on-intl-criminalcourt-sanctions-scope-effectiveness-and-tradeoffs/ [https://perma.cc/5EPB-3RZN].
202. EU Urges US To Reverse ‘Unacceptable’ ICC Sanctions, BARRON’S (June 16, 2020),
https://www.barrons.com/news/eu-urges-us-to-reverse-unacceptable-icc-sanctions01592319305 [https://perma.cc/NQG7-LMDF].
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by no means a “US ally”,203 the threat to target the ICC
demonstrates the degree to which sanctions are being activated,
leading to criticism by numerous nations including many US
allies.204
D. China
Sanctions against China present unique considerations. One,
unlike sanctions against other US adversaries, China’s economy is
the second largest and is extensively integrated with dozens of
large trading partners.205 Two, in the context of the strategic
rivalry, China is well-aware of the potential threat, thereby turbocharging China’s attempts at toppling USD financial control.206
Indeed, Chinese entities, including Chinese banks and shipping
corporations, have increasingly come under sanctions.
China-bound investors are facing risks beyond trade tariffs.
Sanctions are now part of the process, with major shipping

203. See Berschinski, supra note 131 (“No matter what one thinks of the legitimacy
of the ICC’s investigations, threatening the use of the most severe tool in the U.S. diplomatic
arsenal against ICC officials plays to the advantage of every critic of unilateral U.S. action.”).
204. Anthony Deutsch & Stephanie van den Berg, International Criminal Court
Members Defend It in Face of U.S. Sanctions, REUTERS (June 23, 2020, 1:56 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-afghanistan-trump/internationalcriminal-court-members-defend-it-in-face-of-us-sanctions-idUSKBN23U2XT
[https://perma.cc/J6F7-5KS9] (“Over half the member states of the International Criminal
Court defended the world’s only permanent war crimes tribunal on Tuesday in a
diplomatic response to a U.S. threat of sanctions against its employees earlier this
month.”).
205. The
World
Bank
In
China,
WORLD
BANK,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview
[https://perma.cc/X6KW34AX] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (China is the second biggest economy and a vital hub of
global trade).
206. Rennemo, supra note 24, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/with-chinasanctions-america-pushes-the-limits-of-its-financial-power/
[https://perma.cc/X4N6KA2E] (“U.S. Commerce Department tightened sanctions on iconic Chinese technology firm
Huawei . . . Days later, Washington added a further 33 Chinese entities to an export control
blacklist for alleged complicity in human rights violations or ties to the Chinese military.
Concurrently, U.S. legislators tabled bills that would restrict a federal pension fund from
investing in Chinese stocks, limit the ability of Chinese companies to raise capital in the
U.S., and sanction Chinese officials responsible for repressing the Uyghur Muslim minority.
President Donald Trump subsequently ordered his administration on May 29 to revoke
Hong Kong’s preferential treatment as a separate customs and travel territory from
mainland China in response to Chinese legislation that undercuts Hong Kong’s system of
self-governance.”).
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company COSCO getting sanctioned on September 25 as part
of Washington’s anti-Iran policies.207

The interplay between economic rivalry and sanctions is
exemplified with respect to Huawei.208 Huawei has become a target
for US authorities as the business is alleged to have aided evasion
of US sanctions.209 Reports suggest that drastic measures have
been considered, including blocking Huawei from the USD financial
system.210 Therefore, as China is in a vulnerable position with
respect to USD access and subject to USD sanctions, China is
substantially incentivized to internationalize the Yuan.211
E. Digital Currencies and USD Sanctions
US authorities are aware that digital currencies offer an
attractive means to evade sanctions and have developed strategies
at combatting the national security threat posed by deployment of
sanctions evasion.212 OFAC defines virtual currency as a “digital
representation of value that functions as (i) a medium of exchange;
(ii) a unit of account; and/or (iii) a store of value; [it] is neither
207. Kenneth Rapoza, China Investors Face Increasing Sanctions Risk, FORBES (Oct. 1,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/10/01/china-investors-faceincreasing-sanctions-risk/#42fdca745ea4 [https://perma.cc/W75D-NKPE].
208. Trump administration says Huawei, Hikvision backed by Chinese military,
REUTERS (June 25, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/25/trump-administrationsays-huawei-hikvision-backed-by-chinese-military.html [https://perma.cc/9ES3-HMJV]
(“The Trump administration has determined that top Chinese firms, including telecoms
equipment giant Huawei Technologies and video surveillance company Hikvision, are
owned or controlled by the Chinese military, laying the groundwork for new U.S. financial
sanctions.”).
209. David E. Sanger et al., Huawei and Top Executive Face Criminal Charges in the
U.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
28,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/us/politics/meng-wanzhou-huawei-iran.html
[https://perma.cc/BQ8Z-UDCY].
210. Alper, supra note 10, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-usatreasury-exclusive/exclusive-white-house-considered-kicking-huawei-out-of-usbanking-system-sources-idUSKBN1Y717U [https://perma.cc/DYV3-YQU2].
211. China Renews Push for Increased Global Role for the Yuan, MICROSOFT NEWS (July
13,
2020)
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/news/china-renews-push-forincreased-global-role-for-the-yuan/ar-BB16E1x8#image=1
[https://perma.cc/84JMJUH3] (“The increasing spillover of Sino-American tensions into the financial sphere has
ignited a fresh push by China to promote the global use of the yuan.”).
212. Thomas Erdbrink, How Bitcoin Could Help Iran Undermine U.S. Sanctions, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
29,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/world/middleeast/bitcoin-iran-sanctions.html
[https://perma.cc/S573-R88U].
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issued nor guaranteed by any jurisdiction; and [it] does not have
legal tender status in any jurisdiction.” OFAC defines digital
currency to include “sovereign cryptocurrency, virtual currency
(non-fiat), and a digital representation of fiat currency.”213
For example, Iranian nationals were sanctioned in late
2018—as well as the virtual wallet addresses—for exchanging
Bitcoin into Iranian fiat.214 By identifying and cross-referencing
wallets with individuals connected to them, OFAC levied
sanctions.215 The United States has also forbidden US persons from
buying or selling Venezuela’s Petro on the basis that the
cryptocurrency is designed to evade US sanctions:216
What the special purpose vehicle aimed at facilitating
legitimate business with Iran. They are also working to open
INSTEX to economic operators from third countries.217

In 2019, the Iranian government stated that it was planning a
national virtual currency.218 Media reports suggest that various
nations are interested in possibly utilizing such an Iranian
currency as a means to evade US sanctions.219 There is scant

213. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 123.
214. Alastair Marsh, US Exposes Bitcoin Users' Addresses in Iran Cyber Sanctions,
Bloomberg (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-28/us-exposes-bitcoin-users-addresses-in-iran-cyber-sanctions
[https://perma.cc/9WW4SZ3Q] (reporting Iranian hackers exchange Bitcoin payments into local currency).
215. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Iran-Based
Financial Facilitators of Malicious Cyber Activity and for the First Time Identifies
Associated
Digital
Currency
Address
(Nov.
28,
2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm556
[https://perma.cc/P5UEVKX5].
216. S. 1025, 116th Cong. § 701 (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/senateill/1025/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22venezuela%22%5D%7D&r=5&s=1
section 701 [https://perma.cc/5WYW-QXZL].
217. See Press Release, Eur. External Action Serv., Chair’s statement following the 28
June 2019 Meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
(June
28,
2019),
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/64796/chairs-statement-following-28-june-2019-meeting-joint-commissionjoint-comprehensive-plan_en [https://perma.cc/H9GB-A799].
218. Maziar Motamedi, Iran’s central bank issues draft rules on cryptocurrency, ALJAZEERA (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/iran-central-bankissues-draft-rules-cryptocurrency-190129051653656.html
[https://perma.cc/JD33N8BX].
219. Talks with 8 countries over using cryptocurrency in monetary transactions going
on, TEHRAN TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/432400/Talkswith-8-countries-over-using-cryptocurrency-in-monetary
[https://perma.cc/7X4W-
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verifiable information nor confirmation about these other
sovereigns’ intent on accepting an Iranian virtual currency.
US sanctions are relevant to virtual currency exchanges and
banks which process fiat payments with the exchanges.220 The
2014 amendments to the Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist
Financing Act mandate that all crypto currency operators register
as money services businesses, thus forcing strict AML-KYC and
reporting of suspicious transactions obligations.221 US law requires
that virtual asset exchanges maintain records and cooperate with
US enforcement and regulatory authorities.222 The United States is
endeavoring to reduce the chances of sanctions evasion by
obligating exchanges to maintain records, report and cooperate
with investigations, or risk being sanctioned or prosecuted.223
As detailed above, US sanctions are devastating and
increasingly viewed by numerous states as overreach.
Simultaneously, digital currencies are attractive to a growing
P3ED] (naming Austria, Bosnia, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, South Africa, and
Switzerland as countries considering using virtual currency).
220. Exec. Order No. 13,902, supra note 196 (“[Foreign financial institutions include]
any foreign entity that is engaged in the business of accepting deposits, making, granting,
transferring, holding, or brokering loans or credits, or purchasing or selling foreign
exchange, securities, commodity futures or options, or procuring purchasers and sellers
thereof, as principal or agent. The term includes, but is not limited to, depository
institutions, banks, savings banks, money service businesses, trust companies, securities
brokers and dealers, commodity futures and options brokers and dealers, forward
contract and foreign exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, clearing
corporations, investment companies, employee benefit plans, dealers in precious metals,
stones, or jewels, and holding companies, affiliates, or subsidiaries of any of the
foregoing.”).
221. Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, Anti-Money
Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terorrism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-the-financing-ofterrorism/ [https://perma.cc/LZC3-32VQ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
222. See Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or
Using Virtual Currencies, Dep’t Treasury Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network (Mar. 18, 2013),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DTE-6Q9L] (obligating exchanges to maintain records, report and
cooperate with investigations, or risk being sanctioned or prosecuted.) (last visited Oct. 6,
2020).
223. Treasury Designates Iran-Based Financial Facilitators of Malicious Cyber
Activity and for the First Time Identifies Associated Digital Currency Addresses, supra note
215 (“Treasury is targeting digital currency exchangers who have enabled Iranian cyber
actors to profit from extorting digital ransom payments from their victims. As Iran
becomes increasingly isolated and desperate for access to U.S. dollars, it is vital that virtual
currency exchanges, peer-to-peer exchangers, and other providers of digital currency
services harden their networks against these illicit schemes.”).
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number of parties wishing to avoid US sanctions. As discussed in
the next Part, of all the virtual digital currency “wannabees” it is
China that is the most likely to successfully wield a virtual national
currency.
IV. The Digital Yuan
We could be . . . at a juncture where changes in technology –
namely, the introduction of digital currencies – may justify a
fundamental shift in the architecture of a financial system, a
central bank “open to all.”224

China has demonstrated innovative leadership, and it is quite
possible that a digital Yuan will be the first official digital currency
introduced.225 This Part discusses the digital Yuan and implications
of its introduction.
A. Central Bank Digital Currencies
The digitalization of national currencies in the near future is
likely:
Earlier this month, the Bank of England announced that the
central banks of the United Kingdom, Canada, European Union,
Japan, Sweden and Switzerland are in collaboration with the
Bank of International Settlements for joint research on central
bank digital currencies (CBDC). 226

While the vast majority of money in circulation is already
digital (as opposed to paper cash and coins) CBDCs will convert all
money into digital form.227 Doing so will have numerous
ramifications: the ability to transact precise payments; eliminating
intermediaries and lowering costs; efficient divisibility;
interchangeablity with other digital currencies; and a treasure of

224. Fernández-Villaverde et al., supra note 39.
225. Yuan Yang & Hudson Lockett, What is China’s Digital Currency Plan?, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/e3f9c3c2-0aaf-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84
[https://perma.cc/FT9B-JRKS].
226. Press Release, Bank of England, supra note 59.
227. COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS & MARKET INFRASCTRUCTURES, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL
CURRENCIES 1 (2006), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KPZV37Y] (describing how CBDCs will work and noting “cash is rapidly disappearing” and
“central banks are analysing a CBDC that could be made widely available to the general
public and serve as an alternative safe, robust and convenient payment instrument”).
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data collection.228 CBDCs are “expected to offer benefits in terms of
transactional efficiencies, central bank oversight, technological
innovation, and financial inclusion:”229
Ever since the advent of the 17th-century goldsmith-banker in
London, the most crucial thing in banking has been the ledger,
a repository of irrefutable records to establish trust in
situations where it doesn’t exist . . . Blockchain’s distributed
ledgers make trust irrelevant . . . A cumbersome and expensive
network of correspondent banks becomes redundant,
especially when it comes to the $124 trillion businesses move
across borders annually. Imagine the productivity boost;
picture the threat to lenders.230

Replacing cash will also translate into the ability of
governments to gauge the economy in “real time” as data flows on
money supply. Thus, spending and transactions will be immediate
and easily aggregated. Analyzing economic trends will also become
easier. Data collection also raises various privacy and government
surveillance issues since digital currencies can be monitored.
B. China’s Digital Yuan
The PBOC has been developing a digital currency strategy
since at least 2014.231 Subsequent to receiving approval from the
State Council, the PBOC has been diligently and vigorously
collaborating with Chinese financial institutions on establishing
228. Id. at 9 (“In addition to more efficient and safer payments and settlement
systems, CBDC could come with additional benefits. Given that a CBDC can allow for digital
records and traces, it could improve the application of rules aimed at anti-money
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), and possibly help reduce
informal economic activities.”); see also Allen et al., supra note 40, at 1 (discussing the
ability to transact micropayments, data generation and financial innovation likely to
develop from CBDCs).
229. Natalia Cote-Munoz & Sean Silbert, Blockchain in China: A Solution in Need of a
Problem, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 11, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/blockchain-inchina-a-solution-in-need-of-a-problem/ [https://perma.cc/P4V9-TYNQ].
230. Mukherjee, supra note 38 (We could be. . . at a juncture where changes in
technology–namely, the introduction of digital currencies–may justify a fundamental shift
in the architecture of a financial system, a central bank “open to all.”).
231. Fan Yifei, On Digital Currencies, Central Banks Should Lead, BLOOMBERG, (Sep. 1,
2016),
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-09-01/on-digital-currenciescentral-banks-should-lead [https://perma.cc/4VQY-WAHT]; Zhou Xiaochuan, Transcript
of Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s Exclusive Interview with Caixin Weekly, PEOPLE’S BANK OF
CHINA, (Feb. 14, 2016), www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/3017134/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8DX5-QARV].
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the world’s first CBDC, vesting China with a technological-financial
innovation lead.232 A substantial investment and academic
partnership has been working on the digital Yuan.233 China does
not envision using or duplicating independent cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin or having a decentralized currency.234 In fact, the
digital Yuan will be centralized and controlled to ensure
compliance with national economic policy and political stability
which includes a governance framework of control of the internet
and censorship.235 Undoubtedly, concerns over Facebook’s Libra
project have spurred development of the digital Yuan as China
does not want to be subjected to a US corporation’s digital
initiative.236 The fact that Libra is planned to be backed at least fifty
percent by the USD as well as other non-Yuan currencies
undoubtedly alarmed China.237
A successful launch of a CBDC would provide unique “firstmover” advantage to China, potentially ensconcing China as the
leader of global digital payments.238 The digital Yuan could initially
232. See Facebook’s Libra forcing China to step up plans for its own cryptocurrency,
says central bank official, supra note 1.
233. Id.
234. How China Is Closing In on Its Own Digital Currency, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-08/how-china-is-closing-in-onits-own-digital-currency-quicktake [https://perma.cc/5USE-77Z7] (stating that Digital
Yuan will be centralized).
235. Frank Tang, China’s central bank stresses its central role in new sovereign digital
currency, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/economy/globaleconomy/article/3101657/chinas-central-bank-stresses-its-central-role-new-sovereign
[https://perma.cc/DE8N-UN8F] (“Chinese authorities will maintain full control of data
about issuance, circulation and transactions of the digital yuan.”); Paul Muir, Why China’s
digital yuan is ‘a dictator’s dream’, ASIA TIMES (Nov. 27, 2019),
https://asiatimes.com/2019/11/why-chinas-digital-yuan-is-a-dictators-dream/
[https://perma.cc/X38A-F8E3] (“[T]he digital yuan will become a highly effective state
surveillance tool.”).

236. See The High Stakes of the Coming Digital Currency War, supra note 20 (“The
fact that Libra will be pegged to the US dollar will give US authorities additional insight,
because (at present) all dollar clearing must go through US-regulated entities.”).
237. Issaku Harada, Digital yuan nears launch as China sweats over Libra, NIKKEI ASIA
(Dec. 3, 2019), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Currencies/Digital-yuannears-launch-as-China-sweats-over-Libra [https://perma.cc/SK24-7GG4] (stating China
is concerned over Facebook’s libra).
238. See Rise of the central bank digital currencies: drivers, approaches and
technologies,
BANK
INT’L
SETTLEMENTS,
1,
22
(Aug.
2020),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work880.pdf?utm_campaign=BitDigest&utm_medium=email
&utm_source=Revue+newsletter [https://perma.cc/H7BW-49RV] (China is at the most
advanced stage in terms of developing and intruding its CBDC).
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be used for domestic usage; achieving widespread domestic
adoption of a digital Yuan will be aided by the fact that digital
payments are pervasive in China. Effective use of a digital Yuan in
China could aid internationalizing China’s mobile payments
system, and the main players such as WeChat and Alipay have
ambitions to grow globally. UnionPay, the world’s largest
payments entity and a Chinese SOE,239 is already present
internationally in dozens of nations such as Brazil, Israel, and
Japan,240 and millions of vendors outside of China accept UnionPay
mobile payments:241
The Chinese government has taken extraordinary steps to
both protect it from competition in China and to help it expand
across the globe, to the point where almost every credit card
user on the planet has access to a China UnionPay card. In the
near future it will expand to offer its services to consumers in
the United States as well, it appears.242

Digital Yuan usage within China would ostensibly be followed
by the Yuan CBDC being used in cross-border trade and economic
activity particularly within the BRI.243 The potential also exists for

239. Ike Brannon, Put Chinese And American Payment Companies On An Even Playing
Field,
FORBES
(July
26,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ikebrannon/2018/07/26/put-chinese-and-americanpayment-companies-on-an-even-playing-field/#610d0a6e598b
[https://perma.cc/TT6V-4FEB]. UnionPay is state-owned. See State-owned Payment Giant
Takes on MasterCard and Visa Overseas, CHINA BANKING NEWS (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://chinabankingnews.com/2017/04/28/state-owned-payment-giant-takesmastercard-visa-overseas/ [https://perma.cc/4NQL-Y4RR].
240. Israel,
UNIONPAY
INT’L,
http://www.unionpayintl.com/cardholderServ/globalCard/en?countryId=10060042&ty
pe=1 [https://perma.cc/85V2-873G] (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
241. Company News, Four Million Merchants Outside Mainland China Accept
UnionPay
Mobile
Payments,
UNIONPAY
INT’L,
http://www.unionpayintl.com/en/mediaCenter/newsCenter/companyNews/6192.shtm
l [https://perma.cc/B7PF-9WBN] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
242. Brannon, supra note 239.
243. He Huifeng, China to revive international yuan drive along belt and road
countries,
S.
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Sept.
13,
2020),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3101345/china-reviveinternational-yuan-drive-along-belt-and-road [https://perma.cc/B7PF-9WBN] ("China
aims to use the yuan ‘as much as possible’ in its Belt and Road Initiative to try to expand
its use as a reserve currency, a senior Chinese government adviser said on the
weekend.”). This also will incentivize use of China's CIPS along the BRI further increasing
Yuan usage and lessening dependence on SWIFT. Koji Okuda, China's global yuan push
makes inroads in Asia and Africa. Okuda, supra note 100 ("The [CIPS] system has a

88

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1

loans to be denominated in digital Yuan. Should the digital Yuan be
utilized in transactions coupled with an ability to invest the
proceeds from such transactions into other forms of assets
subsequent and conditional on reform of China’s capital markets,
this would substantially contribute to “de-dollarization” and serve
to further create a “Yuan-centric” zone. Additional benefits would
be the ability to promote the digital Yuan as a store of value and of
course evasion of USD sanctions.
One might ask what is the difference between a paper-Yuan
and a digital-Yuan with respect to China’s efforts at promoting an
international Yuan-centric global financial architecture? First,
being the first to move to a digital format would provide an
opportunity for China to set the rules, and as the saying goes . . . “He
who makes the rules, owns the gold.”244 The world is on the
precipice of immense changes in money and banking.245 First
mover status would confer the benefit of standard setting with
respect to currency and e-wallets including: privacy; security;
transparency; central bank monitoring; coordination among
central banks; tax disclosure; and the degree of state-control and
other manifestations of monetary and fiscal policy-setting. Doing
so would inevitably help China set technological rules in other
venues of emergent technology that will shape global governance.
Therefore, a digital Yuan should be viewed in the context of the
hegemonic rivalry—as a stratagem to eviscerate not merely USD
power but to a wider extent, to re-shape global financial
governance and trade. In contrast to the current US model of global
governance, a digital Yuan affords China the opportunity to create
a China-centric order.
Second, a digital Yuan is not merely some “cryptocurrency”
(or a corporate currency such as Facebook’s Libra backed by a
relatively large presence in Africa due to China's economic clout in the region, especially
with its Belt and Road infrastructure-building initiative.").
244. See Joel Slawotsky, He Who Makes the Rules Owns the Gold: The Potential
Ramifications of the New International Law Architects, in J. CHAISSE CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT STRATEGY: BILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL LAW AND POLICY 412 (2019).
245. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANKS AND PAYMENTS IN THE
DIGITAL
ERA
(2020), https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2020e3.htm
[https://perma.cc/GT69-8WJP] (“Digital innovation is radically reshaping the provision of
payment services. Central banks are embracing this innovation. They promote
interoperability, support competition and innovation, and operate public infrastructures all essential for easily accessible, low-cost and high-quality payment services.”).
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basket of currencies), but is planned as an essentially “risk-free”
government backed currency which can function in all capacities
as “real spendable, investable money.”246 As such, a digital Yuan
would be able to be interchangeable seamlessly with commercial
bank accounts and central bank reserves. The digital Yuan e-wallet
could potentially enable an easy transfer of currencies. Buyers and
sellers could conduct transactions without the need for a SWIFTlinked bank, thus removing the dangers of US sanctions. The
benefits of digital money would be instantaneous transfers that
would lead to transformative changes in finance and economics. A
successful digital Yuan would in effect also expedite alignment
with China as nations and businesses would gravitate toward a
currency which could be transferred and converted easily.
Undoubtedly, digital Yuan payments may become popular along
the BRI where members can transact business between
themselves and/or China without the need for USD.
Third, using the digital Yuan may enable payments connected
to the future IoT since digital currencies can allow tiny
micropayments. CBDCs may also reduce or eliminate tax evasion,
money laundering and counterfeiting. Digital currencies visible to
a sovereign will yield tremendous amounts of data that can be
utilized to advance AI. Governments would be able to monitor
economic activity as well as spending habits. If available to credit
providers, the data would substantially impact credit evaluation.
Any governmental social monitoring (i.e., China’s SCS) would also
glean a treasure of data.
C. Discussion and Ramifications of the Digital Yuan
As the PBOC’s Wang Xin noted with respect to Libra:
If the digital currency is closely associated with the US dollar,
it could create a scenario under which sovereign currencies
would coexist with US dollar-centric digital currencies. But
there would be in essence one boss, that is the US dollar and the
United States. If so, it would bring a series of economic, financial
and even international political consequences.247

246. Allen et al., supra note 40, at 82 (“The PBoC envisions the DC/EP as a
replacement for cash and with equal status as a legal tender.”).
247. Frank Tang, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
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Clearly, China would prefer that the digital Yuan be “the boss”
and bring favorable economic, financial and political implications
to China.248 This is not a criticism of China; as Tears for Fears
correctly claimed: “Everybody Wants to Rule the World”.249 China
understands that the status of the USD confers substantial power
to the United States.250 China, naturally, would prefer that other
nations be subject to Yuan sanctions and leverage a Yuan-centric
order to promote China’s national interests as the United States
has masterfully accomplished. A digital Yuan may offer first-mover
advantage to China, and given the substantial advantages to a
digital CBDC251 could serve to promote the Yuan as an alternative
to the USD. Therefore, the digital Yuan is a national security
priority for China252 to further internationalize the Yuan.253
China’s goal of Yuan internationalization is not new, and China
has endeavored for at least a decade to promote the Yuan as a USD
alternative. In the aftermath of the sub-prime financial crisis, China
asserted the need to “de-dollarize” and promoted a diversification
of currencies away from the USD.254 Chinese companies have taken
preliminary steps in support of this state-directed policy.255
248. See The High Stakes of the Coming Digital Currency War, supra note 20 (“and over
the US government’s ability to use the dollar’s global role to advance its international
policy aims.”).
249. Tears for Fears, Everybody Wants to Rule the World (Official Music Video),
YOUTUBE (Aug. 9, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGCdLKXNF3w
[https://perma.cc/YJS3-JK5Q].
250. See Jamil Anderlini, China calls for new reserve currency, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2009),
www.ft.com/
content/7851925a-17a2-11de-8c9d-0000779fd2ac
[https://perma.cc/LA75-KZN9].
251. Dell’Erba, supra note 167, at 39-40.
252. Rennemo, supra note 24 (“After years of weaponizing its currency and economy
for foreign policy influence, Washington is pushing the limits of America’s financial
power.”).
253. See Orange Wang, supra note 32 (“The China Foreign Exchange Trade System
(CFETS), a unit of the Chinese central bank, trimmed the weighting of the US dollar on
Wednesday to 21.59 per cent from 22.40 per cent in a key yuan exchange index. . . . The
move, which comes amid heightened trade tensions between China and the United States,
will help Beijing’s long-term efforts to create an alternative international payments
system.”).
254. See Zhou Xiaochuan, Reform the International Monetary System, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf [https://perma.cc/B257-YQ5F]
(last visited Oct. 14, 2020 ); see also Gregory Chin & Wang Yong, Debating the International
Currency System: What’s in a Speech?, 6 J. CHINA SEC. 1, 3-20 (2010).
255. China Buying Oil from Iran with Yuan, BBC NEWS (May 8, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17988142 [https://perma.cc/Q9S4-L25J] (selling
oil for Yuan); see also Evgenia Pismennaya, Moscow’s ‘Mr. Yuan’ Builds China Link as Putin
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China’s efforts, while productive,256 have not yet constituted a
serious challenge to the USD. The digital Yuan may provide a more
positive opportunity for the Yuan to truly “go global:”
It may start small, but the digital yuan can disrupt both
traditional banking and the post-Bretton Woods system of
floating exchange rates that the world has lived with since
1973. No wonder that for China, “blockchain and the yuan
digital currency are a national strategic priority — almost at
the level of the internet”.257

However, China’s ambitions, alone, will not catapult the
currency to star status. China needs to “sell” the Yuan to the world
as its ultimate success will depend on the extent persons,
businesses and nations are willing to use or hold it. Lower
transactional cost as well as more immediate closing and payment
enabled by blockchain will offer alluring advantages.
In particular, nations directly subject to US sanctions—or
states that are compelled to follow US policy—are particularly
incentivized to find an alternative. Resentment over the USD’s
“exorbitant privilege” and inability to utilize local currencies
contributes to nations seeking an alternative to the current USDorder.258 As USD sanctions have been increasingly invoked, the
interests of states and corporations—including US allies negatively
affected—have coalesced into an interest in digital currencies:
America has used its powers routinely and to their full extent,
by engaging in financial warfare. The results have been aweTilts
East,
BLOOMBERG,
(Sept.
24,
2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-23/moscows-mr-yuan-buildschina-link-as-putin-tilts-east
[https://perma.cc/MTR4-D6MV]
(increasing Yuandenominated trade); Jack Farchy, Gazprom Neft Sells Oil to China in Renminbi Rather than
Dollars FIN. TIMES (June 1, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8e88d464-087011e5-85de-00144feabdc0.html [https://perma.cc/NF4M-N6J9] (oil for Yuan).
256. Alun John, HSBC processes first blockchain letter of credit using Chinese Yuan,
REUTERS
(Sept.
2,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-hldgblockchain/hsbc-processes-first-blockchain-letter-of-credit-using-chinese-yuanidUSKCN1VN1QL [https://perma.cc/Y547-MC2M] (Yuan based blockchain letters of
credit will be in high demand).
257. Mukherjee, supra note 38.
258. John O. McGinnis & Kyle Roche, Note, Bitcoin: Order Without Law In The Digital
Age, 94 IND. L.J. 1497, 1527-28 (2017) (“In developing countries, domestic currency
typically derives its value directly from its exchange rate with the U.S. dollar—a rate often
set directly by the central bank of that nation. However, central banks in these regimes are
often incapable of making the precommitments necessary to encourage individuals to
transact in their currency.”) (footnote omitted).
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inspiring and shocking. They have in turn prompted other
countries to seek to break free of American financial
hegemony.259

The increased deployment of sanctions and perceived
interference in the commercial potential of allies has introduced
heightened interest in alternatives.260
Blowback is evident by the fact that some sovereigns are
looking for an alternative to SWIFT. Iran and North Korea have
been subject to being blocked, leading some nations not aligned
with the United States such as China and Russia to consider a nonSWIFT alternative. As noted above, there is now a SWIFT
alternative engineered by China, CIPS.261 CIPS will enable
international Yuan transfers by allowing messages between
institutions similar to SWIFTS’s ability to authorize USD
payments.262 CIPS has had a successful start and is facilitating
Yuan-based transactions.263
In 2019, several EU nations and the UK established the
INSTEX special purpose vehicle to circumvent SWIFT and conduct
non-USD trade with Iran.264 However, to date only one deal has
259. Dethroning the dollar: America’s aggressive use of sanctions endangers the
dollar’s
reign,
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
18,
2020),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/01/18/americas-aggressive-use-ofsanctions-endangers-the-dollars-reign [https://perma.cc/TJ2P-9A55] (emphasis added).
260. See Geir Moulson, Germany’s Merkel criticizes US gas pipeline sanctions threat,
AP NEWS (Dec. 18, 2019), https://apnews.com/dbf6498cb716796ba9b38fa177713a1b
[https://perma.cc/56VP-W3AB] (“German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Wednesday
criticized a U.S. move to impose sanctions related to a new Russian-German gas pipeline,
signaling that she wants discussions with Washington but declining to threaten retaliation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman said that the U.S. government’s move
violates international law and that the project will be completed regardless of the
sanctions. The U.S. has been an outspoken opponent of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which
will transport natural gas about 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) under the Baltic Sea from
Russia to Germany. Along with eastern European countries that also oppose the project,
the U.S. government argues that it will increase Europe’s dependence on Russia for
energy.”).
261. About
the
System,
CHINA
INT’L
PAYMENT
SERV.
CORP.,
http://www.cips.com.cn/cipsen/7052/7057/index.html
[https://perma.cc/LV4QMQE3] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
262. See Gabriel Wildau, China Launch of Renminbi Payments System Reflects Swift
Spying Concerns, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/84241292-66a111e5-a155-02b6f8af6a62 [https://perma.cc/R44T-R4FM].
263. Rise of the yuan: China-based payment settlements jump 80%, supra note 100
(discussing strong increase in Yuan transactions).
264. Frances Coppola, Europe Circumvents U.S. Sanctions On Iran, FORBES (June 30,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2019/06/30/europe-
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been successfully implemented, and INSTEX has failed to create a
vehicle to evade US sanctions.265 The EU effort has not prevented
plunging oil exports, a deep recession, and a severe economic crisis
in Iran.266 Based on the current statistics, the EU evasion effort has
failed and US sanctions have almost completely cut-off Iran from
the international financial architecture267 following US threats to
sanction SWIFT for transacting with Iranian financial
institutions.268 Iranian economic output has been severely limited,
and Iran has experienced an inability to market its oil and gas.269
1. The Path Forward for the United States
Notwithstanding initial hostility to digital currencies as
witnessed in the lukewarm reception for Facebook’s Libra,270 the
United States’ national security imperative is creating the digital
USD:

circumvents-u-s-sanctions-on-iran/#3257473d2c8d
[https://perma.cc/67CM-5DJB]
(“Europe has found a way of circumventing U.S. sanctions on Iran.”).
265. EU-Iran
Instex
trade
channel
remains
pipe
dream,
DW,
https://www.dw.com/en/eu-iran-instex-trade-channel-remains-pipe-dream/a52168576 [https://perma.cc/5LWS-3932] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (INSTEX “is proving
ineffective.”).
266. See Najmeh Bozoegmhr, Iran’s Fuel Price Crisis Shows Economy Strangled Under
US Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/4d0fefa2-0a1b11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84 [https://perma.cc/BYU7-U699]; see also Six Charts that show
How Hard US Sanctions Have Hit Iran, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48119109
[https://perma.cc/GR6S65ZY].
267. Arshad Mohommed, SWIFT says suspending some Iranian banks’ access to
messaging system, REUTERS (Nov, 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iransanctions-swift/swift-says-suspending-some-iranian-banks-access-to-messagingsystemidUSKCN1NA1PN [https://perma.cc/82SP-QN32].
268. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State & Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary of the
Treasury, Briefing on Iran Sanctions, (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.state.gov/briefing-oniran-sanctions/ [https://perma.cc/HDX3-ML7R].
269. David Adesnik, Sanctions Drive Iranian Oil Exports to Historic Lows, FOUND. FOR
DEF.
OF
DEMOCRACIES
(June
4,
2019),
https://
www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/04/sanctions-drive-iranian-oil-exports-to-historiclows/ [https://perma.cc/LCV3-MUZJ].
270. This position might change going forward as sovereign monitoring and control
of financial markets may become more important in the context of the U.S-China rivalry.
Cote-Munoz & Silbert, supra note 229 (“A state-backed digital currency would allow China
to not only reap the benefits of digital transactions, but also potentially gain a glimpse at
where money is being spent, and by whom, limiting money laundering and following a
growing environment of surveillance. It will allow the government to retain control of the
money supply, and serve as a barrier against international cryptocurrencies.”).
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A US-regulated digital currency could in principle be required
to be traceable by US authorities, so that if North Korea were
to use it to hire Russian nuclear scientists, or Iran were to use
it to finance terrorist activity, they would run a high risk of
being caught, and potentially even blocked. If, however, the
digital currency were run out of China, the US would have far
fewer levers to pull. Western regulators could ultimately ban
the use of China’s digital currency, but that wouldn’t stop it
from being used in large parts of Africa, Latin America, and
Asia, which in turn could engender some underground
demand even in the US and Europe.271

The US Federal Reserve told Congress in November 2019 that
while there were no current plans to introduce a digital dollar, the
potential digital dollar was being evaluated.272 However the
apparent delay in forming a digital USD may be a significant
enabler of a successful digital Yuan.273 Indeed, some in Congress
are concerned that USD power may be at risk based upon “fast
moving developments in other countries that may put our
economy at a competitive disadvantage and threaten the primacy
of the US dollar.”274 Facebook’s CEO openly warned that
abandoning Libra risks handing over the space to China.275

271. See The High Stakes of the Coming Digital Currency War, supra note 20.
272. Michael S. Derby, Powell Says Fed Has No Plans to Create Digital Currency, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-powell-says-in-letter-tocongress-fed-not-creating-digital-currency-11574356188
[https://perma.cc/4CHGSF3K].
273. Billy Bambrough, The U.S. ‘Falling Behind’ On Digital Dollar, FORBES (July 22,
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/07/22/the-us-is-fallingbehind-on-digital-dollar/#77d35ade20e9 [https://perma.cc/XK3T-SD9R] (“But despite
growing calls for the Federal Reserve to begin work on a digital dollar, the U.S. is falling
behind digital currency projects elsewhere in the world, a former head of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has warned.”).
274. Fed Chair Jerome Powell: U.S. looking into digital currency, (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://hill.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6345
[https://perma.cc/37V4-JW2T] (Comments by Representative Bill Foster).
275. Shannon Bond, Mark Zuckerberg Offers A Choice: The Facebook Way Or The China
Way,
NPR
(Oct.
23,
2019,
12:02
AM
ET),
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/23/772075523/mark-zuckerberg-offers-a-choice-thefacebook-way-or-the-china-way [https://perma.cc/YT2J-2XF8] (“Facebook’s CEO claims
that if his creation doesn’t have the ability to achieve their goals of deploying at scale,
China’s alternatives will take their place.”).
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Hesitation for a digital USD because of privacy concerns and
data collection are understandable.276 Spending can reveal truths
and relationships between different people. Spending might also
expose inner ideology (books, donations, affiliations).277 But for
the United States, falling behind the technological advances in
CBDCs risks serious damage to US interests.
For the United States, a digital Yuan must be challenged by a
digital USD.278 From every logical vantage point, it would appear
that it is a matter of time before US authorities comprehend that
failure to expeditiously introduce a digital USD will provide—by
default—first-mover advantage to China. Indeed, calls are
increasing and there is a growing movement to establish a digital
USD.279
The advantages of a digital USD are clear: maintaining
sanctions power; blocking money laundering; obtaining huge
amounts of data which could benefit AI in the United States; and
retaining the US-led international financial architecture. To be
sure, development is probably hindered over privacy concerns
which do not encumber the digital Yuan. Privacy issues as well as
legal or other political considerations may require a longer process
for a digital USD. However, delaying introducing a US CBDC may
expedite Yuan internationalization which plainly, from the United
States’ vantage point, is a serious national security concern.
In addition to developing a digital USD, the United States will
also likely need to re-calibrate the frequency of resorting to
sanctions as objection to imposition intensifies. While offering a
276. See Fed Chair Jerome Powell: U.S. looking into digital currency, supra note 274 (A
digital USD “would raise legal and operational issues.”).
277. See Derby, supra note 272 (“Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell said in a
letter to a congressman . . . that the U.S. central bank doesn’t currently have plans to launch
a digital currency and sees the adoption of something like it difficult in the U.S.”).
278. Arjun Kharpal, Calls for a US ‘digital dollar’ rise as China powers ahead with a
digital yuan, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/23/davos-calls-fora-us-digital-dollar-as-china-works-on-digital-yuan.html [https://perma.cc/873G-HLDV].
279. Tatiana Koffman, U.S. Moves Closer To Digital Dollar, FORBES (July 1, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tatianakoffman/2020/07/01/senate-moves-closer-todigital-dollar/#231461577279 [https://perma.cc/3Y6C-P7HQ] (“On June 30th, 2020,
the Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on the future of the digital dollar. The
pressures to create a digital USD are mounting as China recently began testing its own
digital currency - the DCEP, which will be included in popular applications like WeChat and
AliPay. Of particular concern is widespread adoption of a digital yuan in emerging markets
and in international trade.”).
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seamless and cost-effective replacement for more expensive
alternatives, blowback against sanctions among allies should not
be underestimated. The problem arises because China has astutely
become an important economic actor, and self-interest could
motivate US allies to pull into China’s orbit of influence.280 This
tension is already evident in the realm of 5G where the United
States has urged allies to block Huawei.281 The time between a
prospective digital Yuan and a future introduction of a digital USD
will present China a strategic opportunity to advance the Yuan.
2. The Path Forward for China
China is the first sovereign that has the vision to offer a real
competitive alternative to the USD. China has the incentive,
ambition, resources, political capital—and the will—to introduce
the Yuan nationally, regionally and globally. However, introduction
alone will not fully internationalize the Yuan or propel China
towards hegemonic status. The unmatched freedom of investment
inherent in USD ownership is a compelling argument to resist a
Yuan-centric order. The USD wields substantial incumbent
advantage that China will need to address:
The renminbi is not fully convertible, and China’s capital
controls make it difficult for foreigners to hold the onshore
version. A bigger problem is that as yet China does not have a
tradable renminbi-denominated “safe asset.” Central banks
typically hold reserves in the form of safe assets denominated
in the currency of their choice. But if no tradable safe asset is
available, then they must hold currency, which does not bear
interest and may be less convenient. While this remains the
case, the renminbi’s share of global FX reserves may continue

280. See Verdier, supra note 120 (“In other areas, such as sanctions evasion, allies
have raised diplomatic protests, which may grow louder as U.S. and European policies on
sanctioned countries like Iran diverge. As banks from China and other emerging
jurisdictions gain ground in global markets, the United States may also face a choice
between sparing them—thus limiting the effectiveness of its policies—or risking
dangerous clashes.”).
281. Adam Xu, Facing More Pressure from Washington, Britain Pushes Back on Huawei
Dependence, VOA NEWS (June 5, 2020), https://www.voanews.com/usa/facing-morepressure-washington-britain-pushes-back-huawei-dependence [https://perma.cc/PN6GX6WV] (“The Trump administration’s campaign to keep Chinese tech giant Huawei out of
its allies’ 5G networks appears to be gaining ground in Britain.“).
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to be low, and Asian countries may continue to rely more on
the yen and the dollar than the renminbi.282

To achieve the status of a true competitor currency,
substantial reforms are needed in the areas of capital markets, real
estate and foreign exchange. China’s capital markets are not
adequately opened-up, and China will need to continue to reform
its economy to allow foreigners to invest Yuan in China’s domestic
investment options. The ability to freely invest and liquidate
Chinese assets and transfer proceeds both domestically and
globally as well as freely convert foreign exchange are fundamental
requirements for a Yuan-centric model. Even with respect to
individuals, China imposes restrictions on foreigners who are
forbidden to own income producing property.283 Indeed, even
foreigners who reside and work in China are prohibited from
owning more than one primary-residential property and cannot
collect rent from Chinese tenants.284 Such draconian restrictions
disincentivize holding Yuan as a store of value and substantially
limit the incentive of foreigners to invest and own assets in China.
Whether the CCP is willing to liberalize domestic investments to
foreigners and to permit the direct opening of financial
institutional accounts for non-resident foreigners is an important
question. Doing so is crucial if China wants the Yuan to be a serious
global contender.
China will also need to convince foreign investors that their
rights will be judicially enforced by an independent court system.
An important attraction of the USD is that the United States is
considered a nation with a fair and impartial judiciary, independent
of governmental influence. Foreigners perceive that the US judicial
282. Frances Coppola, Could the Dollar be Replaced as the World Reserve Currency?,
AMERICAN
EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreignexchange/articles/could-dollar-be-replaced-as-world-reserve-currency/
[https://perma.cc/YT25-GBRE] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020); see also Marques, supra note 83
(“China has sought for over a decade to encourage international use of the yuan . . . For a
number of reasons, including capital controls, that has faltered. China accounts for roughly
a fifth of global GDP, but the yuan accounted for barely 1% of international payments.”)
(emphasis added).
283. See Isle Falk, The Struggle is Real: Foreigners Buying Real Estate in China,
NOLASIA,
https://nolasia.net/the-struggle-is-real-foreigners-buying-real-estate-inchina/ [https://perma.cc/FTQ6-QFYE] (last visited Oct. 6, 2020) (stating that China
restricts foreigners to owning a primary home and are forbidden from renting out that
property).
284. See id.
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system is independent and fair, and is available to redress wrongful
conduct.285 For example, many Chinese admired the US federal
courts with respect to their fairness in Ralls Corp. v. Committee on
Foreign Investment.286 The perception of fairness offers a strong
incentive for investing in the United States, creating a huge demand
for USD. 287
In contrast, statements from several Chinese Judges and
officials are not in sync with US judicial values:288
China’s constitution says the people’s courts have the right to
adjudicate, but the Chinese Communist party is formally above
the constitution under the country’s Leninist system of
governance established in the 1950s.289

Whether these concerns are correct or not is irrelevant as
perception matters. China should strive to provide legal
assurances to investors of equal treatment and a judiciary that will
make independent rulings and not be beholden to the CCP.
A digital Yuan is an essential component of China’s
ascendancy and an existential national security priority given the
potential of Chinese entities being sanctioned and cut-off from the
USD-centric financial system. China is particularly incentivized to
make the digital Yuan a successful alternative, competitor, and
ultimate replacement to the USD. While being subject to USD
sanctions is clearly unacceptable to China, just as being subject to
Yuan sanctions in a Yuan-centric world would constitute an
anathema to the United States, the real incentive for China is
eroding US influence in the international economic governance
architecture. The introduction of the digital Yuan has important
potential political-economic implications. The possibility of
285. See, e.g., Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
286. Gerry Shih, In China, many are impressed that, yes, you can sue the U.S.
government,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/08/china-many-are-impressedthat-yes-you-can-sue-us-government/ [https://perma.cc/4VNM-FFVV] (“The idea that a
foreign company can take on the government in its own courts is all but moot in today’s
China . . . [Chinese] marveled that the legal case was being waged at all. As in: you can really
sue the American government — in America?”).
287. Id.
288. Lucy Hornby, China’s top judge denounces judicial independence, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
17, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/60dddd46-dc74-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce
[https://perma.cc/8RB4-P6F7] (reporting that the Supreme People’s Court President
criticizes “false Wester ideals” such as judicial independence).
289. Id.
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significant global trade—whether at the BRI level290 or globally—
taking place outside the reach of the US financial architecture
would represent a pivotal development. Doing so would not only
eviscerate the sanctions power of the United States, but would
undercut the USD’s global role and substantially degrade the
United States' ability to make and enforce “the rules” of
international law and governance.291 Should the USD be deweaponized, the hegemonic status of the United States would be
at-risk.
V. CONCLUSION
A successful digital Yuan may serve as an alternative to the
USD-centric international financial order and would not only reshape cross border trade but would likely be leveraged to shape
norms of CBDCs and global governance. The political-economic
implications of a successful digital Yuan are enormous. China’s
digital Yuan presents therefore unique threats to the USD’s
hegemony over the international financial system. While most
observers believe a USD replacement is “many decades away”,
China’s drive, emergent technology, as well as blowback over USD
sanctions may expedite the process.
Historically, hegemonic currencies rise and fall—no reserve
currency lasts forever. The UK’s pound had replaced the Dutch
Guilder and enjoyed the role of global currency during the 19th
century, coinciding and both reflecting and empowering the British
Empire. The pound served a similar role to the USD—it was the
bones of global commerce. For the last 80 years this role has been
played by the USD as it is the premier global currency. Inroads by
several other currencies such as the Japanese Yen and the Euro
have not come close to toppling the USD. China is ambitious and
has assembled an architecture to advance its objectives. Hubris
290. In the context of China’s BRI, the use of a digital Yuan would further bolster its
prospects. See Heng Wang, China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative: Scope,
Character and Sustainability, 22 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 29, 34 (2019) (“The internationalization of
China’s RMB works hand in hand with the BRI, AIIB, and other development banks of
China. RMB internationalization is related to the BRI concerning trade payment,
investment, and finance, and therefore falls within the actual scope of the BRI.”) (footnote
omitted).
291. The Golden Rule is “He who makes the rules owns the gold.” See He Who Makes
the Rules Owns the Gold, supra note 244, at 412.
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with respect to the USD as the “forever currency” is misplaced and
China’s leadership has been consistently under-estimated by the
United States. In recent years China has masterfully engaged in
robust diplomatic-economic cooperation with developing
sovereigns. The burgeoning alliances impact economic interests
and incentivize economic alignment with China. This is similar to
the coalition of interests the United States enjoyed in the decades
following Bretton-Woods.
A blockchain powered Yuan, the currency of the world’s
second biggest economy already digitalized to a far greater extent
than the United States, might serve as an intriguing alternative to
the USD. The digital Yuan will also facilitate trade with Chinese
companies involved in the immense BRI initiative.
Notwithstanding a widely-held belief that a Yuan challenge to the
USD will require decades, needed reforms to internationalize the
Yuan can be accomplished in a much shorter time span. The
successful introduction and use of the digital Yuan may
dramatically reduce the Long March timeline of Yuan
internationalization. If past performance is any guide, China has
demonstrated an ability to close gaps expeditiously while
simultaneously wielding strategic patience for fulfillment of its
political-economic ambitions.

